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TAKING THE BUSINESS OUT OF WORK
PRODUCT
Michele DeStefano Beardslee*
Over the past fifteen years, a common set of questions has surfaced in
different areas of scholarship about the breadth of the corporate attorney’s
role: Should the corporate attorney provide business advice when
providing legal advice? Should the corporate attorney provide counsel
related to other disciplines such as public relations, social responsibility,
morals, accounting, and/or investment banking? Should the corporate
attorney prevent corporate wrongdoing? Questions like these resound in
the scholarship addressing the risks and benefits of multi-disciplinary
partnerships, gatekeeping, moral counseling, ancillary services, and the
application of the attorney-client privilege. When looked at in combination,
these segregated discussions equate to an unidentified but burgeoning
debate about the proper role of the corporate attorney and whether a
distinction can or should be made between doing business and practicing
law.
This debate also exists in court opinions assessing the reach of recent
SEC regulations, the work product doctrine, and the attorney-client
privilege. Indeed, the application of the doctrine assessing these issues
provides a lens through which to view the tensions created by the
increasingly transdisciplinary and globalized role of the corporate attorney
and the changing contours of litigation. To that end, by analyzing a
sampling of federal court opinions that address the work product doctrine
in the context of work related to public relations, this Article seeks to show
that variations in how the doctrine is applied reflect disagreement about
how expansive the role of today’s corporate attorney and the definition of
litigation should be. Further, given that judges can make decisions about
work product protection based on their often narrow view of the proper
role of an attorney as opposed to a businessperson, this Article argues that
distinguishing between business and law when analyzing the work product
doctrine is not only arbitrary and impossible in the corporate law context,
but also inappropriate. This is clear when considering the history and
purpose of the work product doctrine and the current application of the
corporate attorney-client privilege.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Miami, School of Law. I thank Michael
Bossone, Sergio Campos, Michael Graham, Bruce Green, Dennis Lynch, Austen L. Parrish,
Andrew Perlman, Margaret Raymond, Robert Eli Rosen, and Gregory C. Sisk for advice and
feedback. Also, I thank Peter Cunha for his research assistance.
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Therefore, the more elementary goal of this Article is to offer a refined
approach to the work product doctrine in the corporate law context to
better align it with the reality of corporate practice, corporate litigation,
and the expanded role of the corporate lawyer in today’s society. Although
this Article offers a preliminary recommendation for a new work product
test, its primary recommendation is that courts take the business prong out
of the work product analysis entirely so that (1) courts do not attempt to
make a distinction between business and law when analyzing whether work
is protectable and (2) the application of the doctrine does not hinge on a
judge’s view of how expansive corporate practice or litigation is or should
be. The more ambitious goal of this Article, however, is to urge those in the
legal profession to begin a comprehensive discussion about the proper role
of the corporate attorney and to consider whether, as the responsibilities
and expectations of corporate lawyers grow, and as our definition of
litigation expands, the law’s protective doctrines should follow suit.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 1871
I. THE ROLE OF THE CONTEMPORARY CORPORATE ATTORNEY ............ 1874
A. The Changing Reality for the Corporate Attorney and the
Illusive Distinction Between Business and Law.................... 1874
B. The Burgeoning Debate Over the Role of the Corporate
Attorney................................................................................. 1882
1. Multi-Disciplinary Partnerships ....................................... 1882
2. Gatekeeping ..................................................................... 1883
3. Moral Counseling............................................................. 1885
4. Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege ................................ 1887
5. Summary .......................................................................... 1890
II. OVERVIEW OF THE WORK PRODUCT DOCTRINE ............................... 1890
A. Brief History of the Work Product Doctrine ........................... 1891
B. The Work Product Doctrine Today......................................... 1894
1. The Basics ........................................................................ 1895
a. What the Work Product Doctrine Generally
Protects ..................................................................... 1895
b. Work Product vs. the Attorney-Client Privilege......... 1896
2. General Area of Debate: “In Anticipation of Litigation”
or “Preparation for Trial” ................................................ 1900
a. Temporal Question ..................................................... 1901
b. The “Primary Motivating Purpose” Test, the
“Because of” Test, and the Ordinary Course of
Business Exception ................................................... 1903
c. Materials Prepared by the Attorney Versus
Materials Prepared By Others ................................. 1907
III. THE WORK PRODUCT DOCTRINE AS APPLIED TO WORK RELATED
TO PUBLIC RELATIONS ................................................................. 1909

2011]

TAKING THE BUSINESS OUT OF WORK PRODUCT

1871

A. The “Primary Motivating Factor” Test.................................. 1910
B. The “Because of” Test ............................................................ 1912
C. The Ordinary Course of Business Exception .......................... 1917
IV. ANALYSIS AND PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS FOR FUTURE
DEVELOPMENT ............................................................................. 1922
A. Analysis ................................................................................... 1922
B. Possible Solutions and Preliminary Recommendations ......... 1929
1. Analysis of Solutions Offered By Others ........................ 1931
2. Tentative Preliminary Recommendation ......................... 1934
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................... 1936
INTRODUCTION
Although it may not be identified as such, a debate about the proper role
of the corporate attorney has burgeoned over the past fifteen years.
Arguably, the literature analyzing whether lawyers should be able to form
multi-disciplinary partnerships; whether general counsels should act as
gatekeepers; whether the attorney-client privilege should attach to
communications with in-house counsel or apply to corporations at all;
whether the attorney-client privilege should protect communications with
third party consultants; and whether lawyers should provide moral
counseling or ancillary services like public relations (PR) advice or
financial consulting can all be encapsulated into one overarching debate
about the proper role of the corporate attorney and whether a distinction can
or should be made between the business of law and the business of
business. 1
This debate is exemplified in the application of the work product
doctrine. To date, however, scholars have not focused on this aspect of the
doctrine. Instead, work product doctrine scholarship typically centers on
analyzing the historical policy goals of the doctrine and the pros and cons of
a broad versus a narrow shield. 2 This Article, however, takes a different
tack and has different objectives. Through the exploration of a sample of
federal opinions that address the work product doctrine in the context of PR
work, 3 this Article seeks to make two showings. First, in analyzing the
work product doctrine in the corporate context, courts attempt to make a
distinction between business and law that is not only arbitrary and
impossible to apply but also inappropriate given both the doctrine’s history
and the current application of the corporate attorney-client privilege.

1. See infra Part I.
2. For just such an analysis, see generally Claudine Pease-Wingenter, Prophetic or
Misguided?: The Fifth Circuit’s (Increasingly) Unpopular Approach to the Work Product
Doctrine, 29 REV. LITIG. 121, 125–40 (2009).
3. A search of Westlaw and LexisNexis turned up twenty-four cases that addressed
work product in the context of public relations (PR), advertising, or marketing. In thirteen of
these cases, judges provided work product protection to the work related to legal PR and in
five of these cases, judges determined that the attorney-client privilege applied to the
communications involving PR. This Article considers most of these cases in its analysis.
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Second, courts base the work product decision on their view of corporate
practice, corporate litigation, and the role of the corporate attorney—which,
in the legal PR context, appears to be quite narrow. Both of these
contentions appear true regardless of which of the two main work product
tests a court applies. 4 In application, both tests—the narrow primary
purpose test and the more broad “because of test”—enable courts to deny
work product protection when a motivating factor behind the work is
assisting the party in making what the court believes is a business (as
opposed to legal) decision.5 Admittedly, this Article grows from a belief
that the role of the corporate attorney has grown (both normatively and
practically) over the past twenty years 6 (along with our definition of
litigation) and that the doctrine should follow suit. However, even if a more
narrow view of the role of the corporate attorney is appropriate, arguably
work product protection should not hinge on a particular judge’s vision of
the corporate attorney’s job or corporate litigation.7
Although this Article attempts to make two showings with respect to the
current work product doctrine and provide a refined approach that is better
aligned with the breadth of corporate practice today, the more ambitious
goal is to begin a more open and comprehensive discussion about the
proper role of the corporate attorney and who or what should be
determining those boundaries. What tasks and services should corporate
lawyers provide when protecting the corporate client from a possible suit or
defending the client in litigation? What normative commitments should
they make towards safeguarding the integrity of the legal system? Should
courts be enabled through equivocal doctrine to influence the world view of
a corporate attorney’s job as it relates to client service? Or should the
profession seek to define (confine or enlarge) that view, and if so, should
that definition be based on an assessment of the realities of corporate
practice and litigation or society’s ethical expectations of lawyers, or should
it be more aspirational? In considering these questions, it is important to
bear in mind that corporate lawyers are often expected to, and do, provide
moral, social and political advice and play the role of gatekeeper and a
quasi-public role in safeguarding integrity. 8 In sum, the key questions are:
As the responsibilities and expectations of corporate lawyers expand and
our definition of litigation grows, should not our view of what it means to
4. To determine whether work should be deemed work product, courts presently apply
one of two tests. One test affords protection only when the primary motivating purpose
behind the work was to assist in impending or pending litigation. The other test affords
protection when the work can be said to have been prepared “because of” the impending or
pending litigation. See infra Part II.B.2.b (describing tests and explaining that in at least one
case the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit appears to have adopted a test that is
neither the “primary purpose” nor “because of” test).
5. See infra Part II.
6. See infra Part I.
7. It is true that work product is not the best vehicle to achieve recognition of the
expanded role of corporate lawyers. However, work product should not act as a severe
limiting principle either. Further, the point is that work product doctrine cases addressing
work related to legal PR reflect the larger debate about the role of corporate lawyers.
8. See infra Part I.
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be a corporate attorney expand? And should not our protective doctrines
expand as well?
Part I of this Article reviews the types of business, legal, and professional
services corporate attorneys provide to their clients. It then briefly reviews
the literature analyzing multi-disciplinary partnerships, gatekeeping, moral
counseling, and the attorney-client privilege in an attempt to demonstrate
that an unidentified burgeoning debate exists over what the proper role of
the corporate lawyer should be and whether corporate lawyers should
engage in only the business of law or also in the business of business (i.e.,
the business of providing advice that inextricably incorporates other
disciplines and considerations). Part II provides a brief overview of the
historical underpinnings and general contours of the work product doctrine.
Utilizing recent court decisions addressing whether work product protection
should be applied to work related to public relations, Part III provides a
snapshot of how the work product doctrine is applied in the corporate
context. It seeks to demonstrate that when applying either of the two
predominate work product tests: (1) courts often attempt to make (the ever
elusive) distinction between business and law, and (2) work product
protection can hinge on the court’s view of the role of the corporate
attorney or corporate litigation—which is sometimes quite narrow.
Finally, Part IV provides an analysis of the problems inherent in the work
product doctrine based on its application in the PR context, the doctrine’s
historical underpinnings, and the current state of the legal profession and
corporate legal market and litigation. Further, it attempts to develop a more
refined approach to the work product doctrine to better align it with the
reality of corporate practice and the expanded role of the corporate lawyer
and breadth of litigation in today’s society. To that end, it suggests an
elimination of the ordinary course of business exception and a revision of
the doctrine that eliminates the need or ability to differentiate business from
law so that the application of the doctrine does not hinge on the judge’s
view of how expansive corporate practice or litigation should be. Although
this Article is less concerned with pinpointing the “right” solution than
uncovering the issues with the current doctrine, this part reviews some
possible solutions and attempts to develop the outline of a new test
altogether. It suggests that courts should not protect all documents prepared
“because of” anticipated litigation nor attempt to limit protection to work
that was prepared “primarily” for litigation. Rather, protection should be
reserved for those tangible and intangible materials that are designed to,
can, or ultimately do facilitate case management and/or litigation-related
activities and decisions—whether they assist in preparing materials for trial,
or making decisions about whether to file a claim, implement a certain
litigation tactic, etc. This approach would not only hew more closely to the
history and purpose behind the work product doctrine, but might also serve
several pragmatic ends. It could reduce the amount of time courts spend
distinguishing between business and legal decisions, an arguably
meaningless and inefficient endeavor. Further, this approach might prevent
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an overly narrow or broad view of corporate practice and the contours of
litigation from being outcome determinative.
This part concludes with a call to action. It urges a comprehensive
discussion about the proper role of the corporate attorney and a
consideration of whether, as the regulations, responsibilities, and
expectations of corporate attorneys continue to include what might have
been dubbed “extra legal” and/or “public” duties years ago, the doctrines
that shield attorneys’ work and communications should follow suit.
I. THE ROLE OF THE CONTEMPORARY CORPORATE ATTORNEY
Given the increasing complexity of corporate life, corporate law,
government regulations, international laws and treaties, and the legal
employment marketplace, the role of the corporate lawyer has changed
dramatically over the past fifty years. 9 There is no consensus, however,
over how expansive the corporate attorney’s role should be. The next
section begins by reviewing the changing marketplace in which corporate
attorneys service clients and the impact the changing environment has had
on the corporate attorney’s work, required skills, and expectations. It then
concludes by illustrating the burgeoning debate over the corporate
attorney’s role.
A. The Changing Reality for the Corporate Attorney and the Illusive
Distinction Between Business and Law
While at one time corporate lawyers made their money by providing
legal advice about clearly legal matters and defending clients in the
courtroom, 10 today corporate lawyers—even corporate litigators—spend
most of their time outside the courtroom11 providing advice and services
that, at best, can be described as a mixture of law and business—and a
9. See James W. Jones, The Challenge of Change: The Practice of Law in the Year
2000, 41 VAND. L. REV. 683, 683–85 (1988) (identifying many of the changes that have
affected the structure of the legal profession between 1968 and 1988, including “increasing
complexity” of corporate America and of “the matters that lawyers must handle on behalf of
their clients”); Gregory C. Sisk & Pamela J. Abbate, The Dynamic Attorney-Client Privilege,
23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 201, 209 (2010) (“The augmentation and amplification of law in
our society has played a leading role in bringing about that transformation in the scope of
corporate law practice.”); see also Peter J. Gardner, A Role for the Business Attorney in the
Twenty-First Century: Adding Value to the Client’s Enterprise in the Knowledge Economy,
7 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 17, 17 (2003) (contending that “[t]he two principle influences
that will affect the practice of [business] law are the same ones that will affect virtually all
aspects and sectors of economic activity—globalization of commerce and the transition from
a manufacturing to a knowledge economy.”).
10. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 483–85 (3d ed. 2005);
Charles L. Brieant, Is It the End of the Legal World as We Know it?, 20 PACE L. REV. 21, 23
(1999); cf. GEOFFREY C HAZARD, JR. ET AL., 2 THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 48.2, at 48-4 (3d
ed. 2004) (“In the traditional view of lawyering, lawyers provide legal services (and nothing
else) . . . . In reality, such a rigid separation has never been supportable, . . . and there is no
clear divide between a core of ‘legal’ service and services that are ‘ancillary’ or ‘lawrelated.’”).
11. For example, consider that over ninety-five percent of criminal cases in 2006
concluded before trial. See infra note 314.
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blurry mixture at that.12 Indeed, as Richard Painter states, “[L]egal risks in
many of today’s highly regulated industries like banking, insurance,
airlines, and waste management have become business risks.” 13
Today, lawyers provide an array of services to clients, including
preparing deeds, structuring and negotiating deals, 14 overseeing takeover
bids and mergers and acquisitions, analyzing corporate transactions,
managing legal public relations,15 leading corporate compliance
departments, 16 and assessing risks around disclosures on 10-Ks. This is
especially true in the international corporate law context.17 Partly because
they have the skill sets that make them good at this wide range of mixed
legal/business tasks, today’s lawyers—not necessarily acting as lawyers—
act as businessmen. They take on what are traditionally considered nonlawyer roles. They are brokers, investment bankers, 18 or founders of new

12. Jones, supra note 9, at 684–85 (explaining that it used to be easy to distinguish
between legal and business matters but that distinction is now “quite blurred”); id. (“[A]
lawyer is almost as likely to be focusing on economic, scientific, financial, or political
questions as on strictly legal issues.”); Sisk & Abbate, supra note 9, at 203. Ironically, as far
back as 1950, some courts believed it was the lawyer’s “duty” to consider “relevant social,
economic, political and philosophical considerations” when providing legal advice. United
States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 359 (D. Mass. 1950). Even if not
considered a duty, it was definitely considered acceptable practice to provide what might
have been described as nonlegal business advice. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics,
Informal Op. 844 (1965) (finding that it was not unethical for a “lawyer, with no personal
interest in the insurance and not recommending any particular insurance company or agent,
advising the client as to the desirability of procuring insurance, if his professional
relationship with the client has previously included giving business advice”).
13. Richard W. Painter, The Moral Interdependence of Corporate Lawyers and Their
Clients, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 507, 525 (1994).
14. Brieant, supra note 10, at 23–24.
15. See generally Michele DeStefano Beardslee, Advocacy in the Court of Public
Opinion, Installment One: Broadening the Role of Corporate Attorneys, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 1259 (2009).
16. See, e.g., E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, The Tensions, Stresses,
and Professional Responsibilities of the Lawyer for the Corporation, 62 BUS. LAW. 1, 6–8
(2006) (describing general counsels’ increasing involvement in planning and managing
compliance); Michele DeStefano Beardslee et al., Hiring Teams, Firms and Lawyers:
Evidence on the Evolving Relationships in the Corporate Legal Market 22 (Conference on
Empirical
Legal
Studies
Paper,
2010),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1442066. Note that it is debatable
whether overseeing compliance is, or will be in the future, considered something the general
counsel does as a lawyer. See generally Michele DeStefano Beardslee, The Government’s
Unofficial Stance on Compliance Departments: To Comply or Not to Comply? (Jan. 2011)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) [hereinafter Beardslee, The Government’s
Unofficial Stance].
17. See John Flood & Fabian Sosa, Lawyers, Law Firms, and the Stabilization of
Transnational Business, 28 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 489, 518 (2008) (explaining that corporate
clients facing global issues “expect[] a wide range of services from [their] law firm which
includes legal and non-legal aspects”). As Flood and Sosa explain, conducting a merger
with, or acquisition of, another corporate entity includes assessing legal and tax issues but
also “evaluating the trustworthiness of the [other] company.” Id.
18. See, e.g., Peter Lattman, Investment Bankers Vs. Corporate Lawyers: Join the
Debate,
WALL
ST.
J.
L.
BLOG
(Nov.
21,
2006,
11:30
AM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2006/11/21/investment-bankers-vs-corporate-lawyers-join-thedebate.
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companies. 19 They oversee government affairs departments. 20 They are
chief ethics advisors. 21 They lead and manage PR departments and human
resources along with other departments. 22 Indeed, there is a growing trend
among large publicly traded corporations to select a lawyer to lead the
company in the position of Chief Executive Officer.23 Responding to this
new demand, some law schools have begun to focus more on business skills
than they have in the past.24
Corporate clients today want and need lawyers to provide holistic legal
advice, that is, legal advice that takes into account business concerns and
sometimes, legal advice couched in business terms. 25 As one federal judge
19. The founder of Series Seed is an attorney, Ted Wang. See About the Series Seed
Documents,
SERIES
SEED
(Feb.
24,
2010,
5:53
PM),
http://www.seriesseed.com/posts/2010/02/about-the-series-seed-documents.html.
This is
also true of the founder and CEO of Axiom, Mark Harris. See Litigating For Less, FAST
COMPANY (Dec. 9, 2003), http://www.fastcompany.com/fast50_04/winners/harris.html.
20. In a recent survey sent to general counsels of the entire S&P 500 that elicited a
twenty-eight percent response rate, fifty-five percent reported overseeing the Government
Relations department, and nine percent reported overseeing both the Public Relations and
Government Relations departments. For a detailed description of the survey methodology
and findings, see Beardslee, supra note 15, at Part V.
21. For example, the general counsel of the Department of the Air Force is the chief
legal officer and chief ethics officer. THE DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE GENERAL
COUNSEL, http://www.safgc.hq.af.mil/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2011). The deputy general
counsel of AOL is also the chief ethics and compliance officer. Jaclyn Jaeger, AOL Names
Chief Ethics & Compliance Officer, COMPLIANCE WEEK (Nov. 4, 2010),
http://www.complianceweek.com/aol-names-chief-ethics-complianceofficer/article/191977/. Lawyers are also playing the role of chief ethics officers and
compliance officers at law firms. See generally Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins,
The Emerging Role of Ethics Advisors, General Counsel, and Other Compliance Specialists
in Large Law Firms, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 559 (2002).
22. See Beardslee, supra note 15, at 1287 (reporting that twelve percent of general
counsel respondents oversee the public relations department); Veasey & Di Guglielmo,
supra note 16, at 6–8; see also Robert Eli Rosen, Educating Law Students to Be Business
Leaders, 9 INT’L J. LEGAL PROF. 27, 27 (2002) (contending that law schools should be
teaching business skills to law students because a good percentage of them will be managers
of corporations).
23. This is true of Bank of America, Continental Airlines, Citigroup, Pfizer, Home
Depot, American Express, and Kroger Co. See, e.g., Mark Curriden, CEO, Esq.: Why
Lawyers Are Being Asked To Lead Some of the Nation’s Largest Corporations, ABA
JOURNAL (May 1, 2010, 3:50 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/ceo_esq/
(noting that “[n]ine of the Fortune 50 companies now have a lawyer as chief executive, up
from three just a decade ago”); see also Rosen, supra note 22, at 29 (reporting a study
showing that corporate chief executives are just as likely to have a graduate degree in law as
they are to have one in business).
24. Emma Schwartz, Getting Business School Skills While in Law School, U.S. NEWS
(Mar.
26,
2008),
http://www.usnews.com/articles/education/best-graduateschools/2008/03/26/getting-business-school-skills-while-in-law-school.html;
Top
Law
Schools Are Listening to What Law Firms Want, VAULT (Sept. 23, 2010, 2:16:37 PM),
http://www.vault.com/wps/portal/usa/blogs/entry-detail/index?blog_id=1461&entryid=11881.
25. Howard B. Miller, Law Risk Management and the General Counsel, 46 EMORY L.J.
1223, 1223 (1997) (“The general counsel, comfortable in the worlds of business
management and law, can translate and mediate between the concepts of business risk and
the vocabulary of the law.”); Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 16, at 7 (“General counsel
perform the increasingly important function of assessing legal risks and translating those
risks into business terms in order to facilitate decision making concerning those risks.”); see
also Michele D. Beardslee, If Multidisciplinary Partnerships Are Introduced Into the United
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explained, “In today’s world, an attorney’s acumen is sought at every turn,
even average attorneys mix legal advice with business, economic, and
political.” 26 There is evidence that corporate clients want both inside and
outside lawyers to approach their work in an interdisciplinary way. 27
Arguably as a reaction to this need, outside law firms have structured
arrangements, such as ancillary businesses, to provide related (and
supposedly) non-legal services to their clients including public relations,
investment banking, environmental consulting, management consulting, and
financial services. 28
This, of course, has blurred the distinction between law and business
even further. 29 Given recent decisions in the United Kingdom and

States, What Could or Should Be the Role of the General Counsel?, 9 FORDHAM J. CORP. &
FIN. L. 1, 32 (2003).
26. NXIVM Corp. v. O’Hara, 241 F.R.D. 109, 126 (N.D.N.Y. 2007); see also In re
Cnty. of Erie, 473 F.3d 413, 420 (2d. Cir. 2007); MSF Holding Ltd. v. Fiduciary Trust Co.
Int’l, No. 03 Civ. 1818PKLJCF, 2005 WL 3338510, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2005)
(explaining that in-house counsel often play the role of legal and business advisor).
27. See Neil W. Hamilton, Counseling the Post-Enron Corporation Using the Lawyer’s
Independent Professional Judgment, PROF. LAW., Winter 2003, at 24, 25 (reporting survey
results demonstrating that senior managers value lawyers that have “good judgment,”
provide “practical advice to avoid problems” and “give[] straight advice”); Sisk & Abbate,
supra note 9, at 210 (“When disconnected from particular business realities and values, the
lawyer’s counsel is of little practical value to the client and cannot serve to guide the
business as a responsible and honorable economic actor.”); id. at 205 (“[L]egal counsel
frequently is of value only when integrated with the lawyer’s evaluation of other factors of
practical, economic, emotional, or moral importance to the client.”); Michael A. Knoerzer,
Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Doctrine, BRIEF, Winter 2002, at 40, 41
(“[Inhouse c]orporate attorneys often wear several hats, serving as both legal counsel and
corporate officers. The responsibilities of outside attorneys representing corporations have
also significantly expanded beyond the traditional role as legal counsel. Successful
enterprises increasingly look to attorneys for not only legal but business advice as well.”);
Written Submission of the American Corporate Counsel Association to the ABA Task Force
on Corporate Responsibility 11 (Nov. 11, 2002) [hereinafter ACCA Survey],
http://www.acc.com/legalresources/resource.cfm?show=16245
(reporting that senior
corporate executives look to lawyers to provide counsel in addition to legal counsel, e.g., to
be “a sounding board or confidante” to the CEO, senior executives, and board; “a member of
the strategic planning team;” “a human resources advisor;” “ethics advisor;” or “business or
contract negotiator”); see also Beardslee, supra note 15, at 1299 & nn. 238–40; Greg
Billhartz, Note, Can’t We All Just Get Along? Competing For Client Confidences: The
Integration of the Accounting and Legal Professions, 17 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 427, 435
(1998) (“[Corporate] attorneys have been forced to diversify to meet the demands of their
clients. Today, lawyers are almost as likely to be involved with economic, scientific,
financial or political issues as mere legal ones.”).
28. Gardner, supra note 9, at 53 (“To respond to the needs of such clients and to
growing competition from nonlawyers—and consistent with a trend that is already well
under way—law firms will develop an increasingly wide array of ancillary non-legal
services.”); Jones, supra note 9, at 688–89; Phyllis Weiss Haserot, Multiprofessional Mixes
are Proliferating, NAT’L L.J., Oct. 19, 1987, at 16; Working Notes: Deliberations of the
ABA Committee on Research About the Future of the Legal Profession on the Current Status
of the Legal Profession, 17 ME. B.J. 48, 56 (2002) [hereinafter ABA Working Notes]
(explaining that firms are expanding by developing ancillary services).
29. NXIVM Corp., 241 F.R.D. at 126 (“Many attorneys have actually established dual
professional practices in order to provide a multitude of relevant advice, not necessarily
confined to law advice. Some thoughtful lawyers establish professions independent of the
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Australia enabling outside equity investment in law firms by non-lawyer
investors, 30 along with increased competition from other types of
professional service firms and legal services firms (e.g. legal process
outsourcing agencies), and increased pressure from clients for holistic and
global services, there is new momentum behind change in law firm
structure today. 31 Although new alliances are emerging, 32 there will likely
be even more types of actual and virtual strategic alliances between
lawyers, firms, and other types of legal service providers around the world.
Moreover, even those lawyers who are currently providing a mixture of
business and legal services to meet clients’ needs will likely be challenged
to innovate the kind and delivery of services they provide. As Richard
Susskind suggests in The End of Lawyers?, because information technology
will enable tasks that used to be seen as intricate, unique, and valuable to be
routinized, lawyers will have to provide bespoke work that adds real
value. 33 Lawyers will have to innovate to meet the changing demands of
clients in a 2.0 world, where there is an array of options for legal services.34
practice of law. And oftentimes the line of demarcation as to the nature of the advice is
blurred.”).
30. John Flood, Will There Be Fallout from Clementi? The Global Repercussions for
the Legal Profession After the UK Legal Services Act 2007, 8 ARCHIVE OF EUR.
INTEGRATION,
no.
6,
Apr.
2008,
at
1,
available
at
http://aei.pitt.edu/9010/01/FloodLong08ClementiEdi.pdf; Milton C. Regan, Jr., Lawyers,
Symbols, and Money: Outside Investment in Law Firms, 27 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 407, 407
(2008) (“Two recent developments have startled some people who follow the legal
profession. The first was in May 2007, when the Australian law firm of Slater & Gordon
engaged in an initial public offering (‘IPO’) and became listed on the Australian stock
exchange. The second occurred at the end of October 2007, when the United Kingdom
(‘UK’) passed legislation allowing non-lawyer investors to acquire interests in law firms in
England and Wales.”); see also Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29, § 89, sch. 18 (Eng.),
available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2007/29/data.pdf; Alexia Garamfalvi, In a
First, Law Firm Goes Public, LEGAL TIMES, May 22, 2007, available at
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1179751700602.
31. Sisk & Abbate, supra note 9, at 209; ABA Working Notes, supra note 28, at 55; see
also Gardner, supra note 9, at 17 (“Globalization will also introduce pressures that are more
specific to the legal profession, including an accelerating trend toward specialization,
growing resistance to ‘unauthorized practice of law’ regulations, and incentives to develop
multidisciplinary practices.”).
32. See Milton C. Regan, Jr., Professional Responsibility and the Corporate Lawyer, 13
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 197, 203–04 (2000) (“A parent firm may be in one country, its
subsidiaries in several others, and its joint venture partners or licensees in still others.”). For
example, in 1999, Roger & Wells, Clifford Chance, and Pünder, Volhard, Weber & Aster
merged. See John E. Morris, The New World Order, AM. LAW., Aug. 1999, at 92. See
generally Richard L. Abel, Transnational Law Practice, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 737
(1994); David M. Trubek et al., Global Restructuring and the Law: Studies of the
Internationalization of Legal Fields and the Creation of Transnational Arenas, 44 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 407 (1994); Katheryn Hayes Tucker, Virtual Law Firms Stay Afloat in Tough
Times,
LAW.COM
(May
26,
2009),
http://www.law.com/jsp/
lawtechnologynews/PubArticleLTN.jsp?id=1202430945937.
33. See generally RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS?: RETHINKING THE NATURE
OF LEGAL SERVICES 2–3 (2008).
34. See generally id.; Gardner, supra note 9, at 18 (“[T]he twenty-first century will
demand that business law practitioners shift their focus from efficiency to producing
effective legal services that add value directly to the client’s business activities. The
attorney’s value-adding service will, in part, entail enabling the client to make better
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The legal profession, however, has not reached consensus on the
appropriate role of the corporate attorney as it relates to providing a mixture
of legal and business services. 35 Some view the idea of a broadened role as
a moneymaking initiative that is denigrating to the image of the legal
profession. 36 This group, unlike Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. and W. William
Hodes, believes there is a “supportable,” “rigid separation,” and a “clear
divide between a core of ‘legal’ service and services that are ‘ancillary’ or
‘law-related.’” 37 Others are less unequivocal. They question whether “the
profession [can] benefit from the experiences of business while still
maintaining its professional values.” 38 Then there is the group that
wholeheartedly embraces the enlarged view of corporate practice and, as a
result, has a broader vision of corporate litigation and what being a
corporate lawyer means. Those in this group believe that “[s]weeping
changes in the modern competitive and global economy, forms and means
of doing business, and regulatory environment have made it essential for
lawyers who advise corporations and other business associations to evolve
in their role and offer a broader array of legal and law-related services.”39
They recognize that what may have been traditionally classified as
“nonlegal tasks such as negotiating contracts, analyzing potential corporate
transactions, and investigating potential claims,” 40 are no longer classifiable
as “nonlegal” when they are performed by a corporate lawyer today. This is
because, to put it simply—once a lawyer always a lawyer. 41 As Gregory
business decisions by using the thinking and analysis behind the attorney’s legal advice,
rather than merely providing the advice itself. This new business method will require that
business lawyers and their firms develop a culture of innovation and make a continual
commitment to create new knowledge that will contribute value to a client’s enterprise.”).
35. See Jones, supra note 9, at 692.
36. See COMM’N ON PROFESSIONALISM, ABA, “. . . . IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SERVICE:”
A BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM 3 (1986),
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/professionalism/Stanley_Commission_Report.pdf.
37. 2 HAZARD, JR. ET AL., supra note 10, § 48.2, at 48-4.
38. ABA Working Notes, supra note 28, at 58.
39. Sisk & Abbate, supra note 9, at 209; see also THOMAS D. MORGAN, THE VANISHING
AMERICAN LAWYER 136 (2010) (contending that successful lawyers “will be those who can
make themselves the best available go-to person in a combined law-and-substantive field”);
Billhartz, supra note 27, at 428 (“The legal profession, on the other hand, has sought to
expand the definition of ‘legal services’ to include management consulting services, and then
to protect such practices from encroachment by enforcing various professional rules and
guidelines under the guise of unauthorized practice of law prohibitions.”); cf. Laurel S.
Terry, The Future Regulation of the Legal Profession: The Impact of Treating the Legal
Profession as “Service Providers”, 2008 J. PROF LAW. 189, 189 (viewing lawyers as service
providers and the legal profession as “included in a broader group of ‘service providers,’ all
of whom can be regulated together”).
40. Knoerzer, supra note 27, at 41.
41. To that end, it is not clear to the Author that corporate lawyers who have practiced as
lawyers for some significant amount of time can ever truly claim that they are no longer
acting as lawyers. This view is based in part on over twenty in-depth interviews with
general counsels and chief compliance officers at large S&P 500 corporations. For further
discussion, see Beardslee, The Government’s Unofficial Stance, supra note 16. That said,
there are a lot of lawyers that have taken off their lawyer hat in the business world to become
other types of business consultants including PR consultants, real estate consultants, and
even “law” consultants. See Tanina Rostain, The Emergence of “Law Consultants,” 75
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Sisk and Pamela Abbate point out, “[T]he lawyer evaluates each matter
from a distinctly legal perspective, identifying the legal implications,
verifying compliance with regulatory regimes, looking for the advantages
and disadvantages offered or posed by legal standards, and assessing the
legal risks.” 42 At the other extreme are those corporate attorneys, identified
by James W. Jones, that view themselves as general “professional problem
solvers”—i.e., business counselors that happen to have a legal degree.43
This debate is not simply about whether lawyers should consider other
disciplines in their analysis and provide advice that takes account of the
legal and business concerns. Instead, as Milton C. Regan points out, it is
also about the extent to which corporate attorneys should utilize other
disciplines and factors to counsel clients to refrain from “exploiting every
possible legal advantage, for the sake of both the client’s long-term interest
and that of society as a whole.” 44 There is also evidence that lawyers are
being relied on by clients and the public at large to play such a quasi-public
role—to be gatekeepers. 45 For example, corporate attorneys (especially inFORDHAM L. REV. 1397, 1405–06 (2006) (explaining that former lawyers are now consulting
in a wide variety of legal subjects including ethics, employment law, compliance, and risk
management). These former lawyers, now acting as non-lawyers, might still be providing
some type of legal advice or their clients might have that expectation, but Tanina Rostein
points out that these now non-practicing lawyers are no longer held to the legal ethics rules
like other lawyers. Id. at 1398, 1412. Further, she argues, there are regulatory incentives to
hiring a law consultant as opposed to counsel. Id. at 1412.
42. Sisk & Abbate, supra note 9, at 210.
43. Jones, supra note 9, at 693 (warning that “one obviously can push this notion too
far”); see also Gardner, supra note 9, at 39 (“To generalize, a business lawyer plans
strategies, negotiates deals, resolves disputes, structures transactions to mitigate risks by
anticipating contingencies, and advises clients of possible consequences and costs of
particular decisions or actions. To generalize further, good attorneys solve clients’
problems.” (citations omitted)); id. at 41 (explaining that problem solving is how corporate
lawyers add value); Hamilton, supra note 27, at 28 (“[A]n attorney representing a corporate
organization must have, in addition to knowledge of corporate law, a basic understanding of
the business, its goals, its culture, and its business ethics in order to counsel the directors and
senior management regarding the best interests of the organization in the situation
presented.”).
44. Regan, Jr., supra note 32, at 207; see also Michele DeStefano Beardslee, The
Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege: Third-Rate Doctrine for Third-Party Consultants, 62
SMU L. REV. 727, 736–42 (2009) (contending that consultation with third party specialists is
sometimes essential to the provision of comprehensive legal advice and services); Sisk &
Abbate, supra note 9, at 205 (“[L]egal counsel frequently is of value only when integrated
with the lawyer’s evaluation of other factors of practical, economic, emotional, or moral
importance to the client.”); ACCA Survey, supra note 27, at 11 (including “ethics advisor”
in the list of roles that senior management find important for lawyers to play). Interestingly,
the American Bar Association was formed, and the Canon of Ethics promulgated, as efforts
to support the perception that law is a profession and not just a business. See generally
JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN
AMERICA 50–53, 62–73 (1976).
45. Michele DeStefano Beardslee, Advocacy in the Court of Public Opinion, Installment
Two: How Far Should Corporate Attorneys Go?, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1119, 1170–71
(2010) (reviewing the contexts in which lawyers are expected to play a gatekeeping role);
Regan, Jr., supra note 32, at 207; Tanina Rostain, General Counsel in the Age of
Compliance: Preliminary Findings and New Research Questions, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
465, 473–74 (2008) (finding that general counsels in her study played a gatekeeping role and
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house general counsels) manage legal public relations around corporate
controversies to help corporate clients prevail on legal matters, as well as to
protect their reputation and market share.46 Yet some corporate clients also
rely on those same attorneys to help them find the right balance between
protecting their own agenda and safeguarding public interests.47
An example of this is in SEC regulations that require lawyers to report up
(and eventually out) when they discover “credible evidence” of a “material”
disclosure violation, 48 that is, when there is “‘a substantial likelihood that
the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable
investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made
available.’” 49 In further support is the trend in legal practice and regulation
to require lawyers to be more cognizant of the social externalities of their
corporate clients’ actions and subject lawyers to more liability. 50 To that
end, the debate about whether lawyers should be in the business of law or
the business of business has both public and private features 51 and is not—
nor should it be—only concerned with the practicum of the contemporary
corporate attorney, but also the potentially normative dimension of
corporate lawyers’ work. That the legal profession has not reached
consensus on the role of the corporate attorney (both with respect to
whether lawyers should provide a mixture of business and law services and
whether lawyers should be safeguarding the corporate and public trust) is
made clear in many different segments of scholarship including those
addressing multi-disciplinary partnerships, gatekeeping, moral counseling,
the corporate attorney-client privilege,52 and, as will be analyzed in depth in
Parts II and III of this Article, the work product doctrine.

managed the decision around what legal risks the company should take); cf. Christine E.
Parker et al., The Two Faces of Lawyers: Professional Ethics and Business Compliance with
Regulation, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 201, 205 (2009) (reporting evidence that “[c]lients who
are committed to compliance hire lawyers to help promote compliance in their organizations,
and those who are committed to resistance hire lawyers to resist compliance” and that “to the
extent lawyers influence clients, it is towards game-playing, not commitment to compliance
or resistance to compliance”).
46. See generally Beardslee, supra note 15.
47. Beardslee, supra note 45, at 1167.
48. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 307, 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2006); 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(e)
(2010).
49. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988) (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v.
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)).
50. Regan, Jr., supra note 32, at 204–06 (describing the increase in common law
theories, stricter disclosure and compliance obligations, and other regulations, such as
malpractice, breach of fiduciary duties, negligent representations, and bankruptcy disclosure
rules, that hold lawyers more accountable and to a wider range of constituents).
51. Cf. id. at 207 (noting how the quasi-public role of lawyers impacts their client
interactions).
52. See infra Part I.B.
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B. The Burgeoning Debate Over the Role of the Corporate Attorney
1. Multi-Disciplinary Partnerships
In 1999, the ABA Commission originally recommended that Model Rule
of Professional Conduct 5.4 be revised to allow attorneys to create multidisciplinary partnerships (MDPs) with non-lawyers, that is, to allow
lawyers to share fees with non-lawyers and offer non-legal and legal
services. 53 However, in July of 2000, the ABA House of Delegates rejected
the ABA Commission’s recommendation. 54 For a while, it appeared that
the dispute over MDPs had stalled, but recent developments in the United
Kingdom and Australia allowing outside investment in law firms have
breathed new life into it.55 The arguments for and against allowing MDPs
are tangled up with the debate about corporate lawyers’ role and whether
lawyers should be providing advice that might be considered either
business, legal, or both. Those in favor of MDPs essentially argue that
lawyers need to follow the times and their clients’ needs. 56 They point out
that that the legal profession’s ethics rules permit ancillary businesses and
strategic alliances 57 but, more than that, they emphasize that MDPs already
exist in other countries 58 and that they provide corporate clients the type of
They emphasize the impossibility of
service they need today. 59
distinguishing what is law from what is business. 60 Those against MDPs
53. Report and Recommendation of the District of Columbia Bar Special Committee on
Multidisciplinary Practice, D.C. BAR, http://www.dcbar.org/inside_the_bar/structure/reports/
special_committee_on_multidisciplinary_practice/background.cfm (last visited Mar. 23,
2011) (explaining that the ABA Commission also proposed revising Model Rule 1.10 to
allow for more expansive disqualification based on conflicts with any client of the multidisciplinary partnership (MDP)).
54. Edward J. Cleary, Multidisciplinary Practice: One Year Later, BENCH & B. MINN.,
Sept. 2000, available at http://www2.mnbar.org/benchandbar/2000/sep00/mdp_profresp.htm. The current Model Rules of Professional Conduct prevent non-lawyers from
sharing a law firm’s ownership or profits. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (2010).
Motivating this decision were concerns around professional independence, confidentiality,
and conflicts of interest. Beardslee, supra note 25, at 36–37; see also ABA Working Notes,
supra note 28, at 52.
55. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
56. See, e.g., Gardner, supra note 9, at 28 (explaining that enabling MDPs would allow
lawyers to better service their clients, compete in the economic marketplace, and “serve the
interests of the American economy as well”).
57. See, e.g., Gianluca Morello, Note, Big Six Accounting Firms Shop Worldwide for
Law Firms: Why Multi-Discipline Practices Should be Permitted in the United States, 21
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 190, 248 (1997).
58. Mary C. Daly, Choosing Wise Men Wisely: The Risks and Rewards of Purchasing
Legal Services from Lawyers in a Multidisciplinary Partnership, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
217, 227–34 (2000); Katherine L. Harrison, Comment, Multidisciplinary Practices:
Changing the Global View of the Legal Profession, 21 U. PA. J. INT’L. ECON. L. 879, 918–19
(2000).
59. Laurel S. Terry, A Primer on MDPs: Should the “No” Rule Become a New Rule?,
72 TEMP. L. REV. 869, 911 (1999) (noting that the ABA Commission on MDPs “concluded
that there was client demand for MDPs on the part of both individual and corporate clients”
as well as an “interest among lawyers in forming partnerships with nonlawyers”).
60. Carol A. Needham, Permitting Lawyers To Participate in Multidisciplinary
Practices: Business as Usual or the End of the Profession as We Know It?, 84 MINN. L.
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rely on arguments about the traditional role of the corporate attorney and
emphasize that MDPs will create conflicts of interest and jeopardize the
reputation of the legal profession, a lawyer’s independent judgment, and the
attorney-client privilege. 61 Ironically, these are the same arguments that
were used—unsuccessfully—against allowing in-house counsel, ancillary
businesses, and lawyers to join legal services organizations.62
2. Gatekeeping
According to Sung Hui Kim, a similar “war” exists in the literature
addressing gatekeeping. 63 Scholars and lawyers alike are debating whether
and in what circumstances lawyers should behave as gatekeepers—that is,
act as agents that oversee work in a way designed to prevent or stop
misconduct that could harm capital markets. 64 Some groups oppose any
attempt by outsiders to impose gatekeeping duties on lawyers. For
example, the ABA and many individual state bar associations have
consistently resisted attempts to require gatekeeping responsibilities of
lawyers. 65 Some of those opposing the gatekeeper role do so because they
believe that corporate attorneys have essentially been set up to fail because
they cannot adequately fill the role, given their ethical duties and
relationships with clients.66 They fundamentally believe attorneys should
REV. 1315, 1327 (2000); see also Terry, supra note 59, at 873 (“‘[T]he definition of the
‘practice of law’ is frustratingly illusive. . . . [as] it is almost impossible to define with
precision what constitutes the practice of law in the United States today . . . .’” (first
alteration in original) (quoting Written Remarks of James W. Jones, Vice Chairman and
General Counsel, APCO Associates, Inc. (Feb. 6, 1999))).
61. See Daly, supra note 58, at 264; John H. Matheson & Peter D. Favorite,
Multidisciplinary Practice and the Future of the Legal Profession: Considering a Role for
Independent Directors, 32 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 577, 599–605 (2001).
62. See Daly, supra note 58, at 271 (noting that “[f]or a long time, the legal profession
seriously questioned whether in-house counsel could exercise the requisite degree of
independence of professional judgment. Those questions have largely disappeared. Similar
reservations were once expressed about the lawyers employed by legal services
organizations, unions, and prepaid legal plans. Those reservations too have disappeared.”);
Morello, supra note 57, at 222–23.
63. Sung Hui Kim, Lawyer Exceptionalism in the Gatekeeping Wars, 63 SMU L. REV.
73, 76 (2010).
64. Id. at 75–76. Scholars have defined the word gatekeeper in different ways.
Commonly, the word “gatekeeper” refers to an agent that is either required to, or voluntarily
attempts to, prevent or stop some type of corporate misconduct including the disclosure of
misleading information that may influence investors. See, e.g., JOHN C. COFFEE, JR.,
GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2–3 (2006); Beardslee,
supra note 45, at 1126 n.21; Kim, supra note 63, at 75; Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers:
The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 53 (1986).
65. For example, the ABA argued against what the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 307,
15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2006) essentially codified. See Deborah L. Rhode & Paul D. Paton,
Lawyers, Ethics and Enron, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 625,
628 (Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004). For bar opposition to the ABA’s
stance, see id. at 645. See generally Susan P. Koniak, When the Hurlyburly’s Done: The
Bar’s Struggle with the SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1236 (2003).
66. See Sung Hui Kim, The Banality of Fraud: Re-Situating the Inside Counsel as
Gatekeeper, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 983, 986 (2005); Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Counseling,
75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1317, 1330 (2006) (explaining that one reason why lawyers abdicate
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not be counselors, may not breach confidentiality, and, as agents of their
clients, should act as advocates and zealously represent their clients at all
times and in all contexts.67 Others argue that corporate attorneys should be
playing a gatekeeping role for their corporate clients despite the difficulties
in doing so and the conflicting ethical and legal obligations.68 They believe
that attorneys, as opposed to other professionals, are uniquely suited to fill
this role because of their ethical obligations such as the duty of candor and
honesty to other parties and third persons and their historic place as
social responsibility is that they believe “that casting lawyers in the role of ethical
gatekeepers will discourage the trust and candor from clients that is essential to effective
representation. The result will be less compliance counseling, not more.”). There is lack of
consensus on whether inside or outside counsel are more able to play the role of gatekeeper.
See Beardslee, supra note 45, at 1165 n.234 (describing this lack of consensus).
67. COFFEE, JR., supra note 64, at 192 (contending that the bar “prefers to view the
attorney as an advocate, whose sole duty is the zealous representation of the client”); Letter
from the Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n
(Dec.
17,
2002)
[hereinafter
ABCNY
Letter],
available
at
http://ftp.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/elmilonas1.htm (commenting on proposed SEC
Rules implementing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002); see Kimberly Kirkland, Ethics in
Large Law Firms: The Principle of Pragmatism, 35 U. MEM. L. REV. 631, 718 (2005)
(explaining that some of the litigators she interviewed “felt they had an affirmative moral
obligation to zealously represent their clients, and the majority of them saw themselves as
agents of their clients, not counselors” and believed they did not have “any obligation to
attempt to constrain [their client’s] will”); Rhode, supra note 66, at 1330 (explaining that one
of the primary objections lawyers raise to broader social responsibilities is that “[w]here
clients’ rights are at stake, they deserve a zealous advocate, not a super ego or government
watchdog. Lawyers’ function is to defend, not judge, those they represent . . . .”); Fred
Zacharias, Lawyers as Gatekeepers, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1387, 1387–88 & n.4 (2004)
(stating that naysayers believe that playing the role of gatekeeper is akin to playing the role
of a secret agent); ABCNY Letter, supra (arguing against proposed regulations by the SEC
that “impose obligations requiring or, in some circumstances, allowing an attorney to act
against the client’s interest” because, in part, “[t]he rules as drafted, if aggressively enforced,
could eviscerate the attorney’s traditional role as advocate, confidant and advisor”).
68. See, e.g., Beardslee, supra note 45, at 1126 n.21 (arguing that “[t]he corporate
general counsel, in the role of media gatekeeper, should help separate the unwanted (the
misleading), from the desired (the properly positioned) information in public
communications about legal controversies”); Elizabeth Cosenza, Rethinking Attorney
Liability Under Rule 10b-5 in Light of the Supreme Court’s Decisions in Tellabs and
Stoneridge, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 47–48 (2008) (arguing that the “the substantial
participation standard” of liability is the best standard because it promotes “accurate and
continuous disclosure” and enforces lawyers’ “traditional role as gatekeepers of the
securities market”); Koniak, supra note 65, at 1274–75, 1279 (stating that while “noisy
withdrawal” is a good idea, “a strong internal reporting requirement would be nearly as
good” and ultimately concluding that “even a strong up-the-ladder rule is not enough. The
enforcement gaps in the law governing lawyers need to be closed.”); see also ANTHONY T.
KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 3, 284 (1993)
(contending that inside lawyers should play the “lawyer-statesman” role); John C. Coffee,
Jr., The Attorney as Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1293, 1305–
07 (2003) (explaining the rationale for requiring lawyers to play a gatekeeping function);
Ben W. Heineman, Jr., Caught in the Middle, CORP. COUNS., April 2007, available at
http://www.wilmerhale.com/ﬁles/Publication/92fd97ff-de9d-4501-9d29-90712709dd43
/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/c49ca19c-86ca-41b8-a5bd-015eeb306339/Heineman
_CaughtintheMiddle.pdf (arguing that inside lawyers need to act as guardians of a
corporation’s integrity and reputation despite conflicting role as business partner and leader);
Ben W. Heineman, Jr., The Ideal of the Lawyer-Statesman, ACC DOCKET, May 2004, at 58,
62.
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“officer[s] of the court.” 69 They believe that corporate lawyers can serve as
“autonomous agent[s] of social control and law enforcement” and argue that
the most important characteristics of corporate lawyers is their ability to say
something is not “right” even though it may be legally sound, to encourage
corporate clients to think beyond short term interests, to be more honest,
and to behave socially responsibly. 70
3. Moral Counseling
Related to what Sung Hui Kim has referred to as the “gatekeeping
wars” 71 is the disagreement over whether corporate lawyers should provide
moral counseling to corporate clients. According to Deborah Rhode, the
answer to that question “depends on who you ask.” 72 Some scholars, like
William Simon, argue that lawyers should remain connected to ordinary
morality and should counsel clients with the greater good in mind, in an
attempt to promote justice.73 Some, such as Rhode and Robert K. Vischer,
contend that in the corporate context (among others) “lawyers have a moral
responsibility to provide moral counseling, whether or not it can be
packaged in pragmatic terms.” 74 “Rather than asking only whether a given
69. Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1074 (1991) (quoting Cohen v. Hurley,
366 U.S. 117, 126 (1961)); see also MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY pmbl. (1969)
(“Lawyers, as guardians of the law, play a vital role in the preservation of society. The
fulfillment of this role requires an understanding by lawyers of their relationship with and
function in our legal system. A consequent obligation of lawyers is to maintain the highest
standards of ethical conduct.”); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 1 (2010) (“A
lawyer, as a member of the legal profession, is a representative of clients, an officer of the
legal system and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice.”); id.
R. 3.3 cmt. 2; Judith A. McMorrow et al., Judicial Attitudes Toward Confronting Attorney
Misconduct: A View From the Reported Decisions, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1425, 1440 (2004)
(referring to case opinions that embrace the idea that lawyers should be “officers of the
court”); cf. Zacharias, supra note 67, (contending that in fulfilling their traditional
responsibilities, lawyers have always played the role of gatekeeper).
70. Robert A. Kagan & Robert Eli Rosen, On the Social Significance of Large Law Firm
Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 399, 410–11 (1985); see also Gardner, supra note 9, at 37 (“As
corporate managers can be preoccupied with short-term problems and therefore may ignore
legal advice not forcefully given, lawyers are called upon actively to encourage and promote
measures designed to protect corporate interests.”).
71. See Kim, supra note 63, at 76.
72. Rhode, supra note 66, at 1317.
73. WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYER’S ETHICS 138
(1998) (“Lawyers should take those actions that, considering the relevant circumstances of
the particular case, seem likely to promote justice.”); William H. Simon, Role Differentiation
and Lawyer’s Ethics: A Critique of Some Academic Perspectives, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
987, 1009 (2010) (arguing for lawyers’ role based on “conduct [that] would best vindicate
the relevant substantive norms and would best promote fair adjudication of the dispute”); see
also DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 67 (2007); David Luban, How Must
a Lawyer Be? A Response to Woolley and Wendel, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1101, 1116–17
(2010) (“My theory requires that lawyers be ‘relentlessly focused’ on morality only in the
sense that they cannot hide behind their role or the adversary system to release themselves
from moral obligations that they would have if they weren’t lawyers. They need be no more
relentlessly focused on morality than non-lawyers are.”).
74. Rhode, supra note 66, at 1319; Donald C. Langevoort, Someplace Between
Philosophy and Economics: Legitimacy and Good Corporate Lawyering, 75 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1615, 1618, 1624–28 (2006) (arguing that there is a value in substituting “legitimacy
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course of conduct is arguably legal, lawyers should ask: ‘Is it fair?’ ‘Is it
honest?’ ‘Is it socially legitimate?’ ‘Does it thwart the purpose of the law
or pose unreasonable risks?’” 75
Others argue that it is not the proper role of the attorney to ask these
questions. They envision the lawyer as the means by which clients access
the law, and therefore, believe that the lawyer should play an “amoral”
role—that is, they should remain agnostic as long as the client’s ends are
within legal bounds. 76 Indeed, like those who attempt to draw a line
between business and law, those who view moral counseling as outside the
purview of a corporate lawyer’s role see a strong delineation between
legality and morality, and believe that lawyers should only provide advice
and information about the former and not the latter—unless the client
specifically requests it.77 These same individuals believe that counseling—
above and beyond simply laying out the legal risks of options—is a
business decision for the client. 78 Those ascribing to this view point to the
legal profession’s ethical rules that seem to position the lawyer as an
for morality” because, among other things, it “describe[s] a form of professional
responsibility that does not devolve into simple legal risk calculation”); Robert K. Vischer,
Legal Advice as Moral Perspective, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 225, 269 (2006) (arguing that
lawyers should present their own ethical views when providing moral advice).
75. Rhode, supra note 66, at 1333; see also Roger C. Cramton, Delivery of Legal
Services to Ordinary Americans, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 531, 611 (1994); cf. Thomas D.
Morgan, Economic Reality Facing 21st Century Lawyers, 69 WASH. L. REV. 625, 636 (1994)
(arguing that “[t]he twenty-first century lawyer . . . [must] build community rather than
foster division” and must “be committed to the rule of law and to fair and equitable legal
processes”).
76. Contra Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer’s Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, a
Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613, 628–33 (explaining that
lawyers should not play an “amoral” role and that, in some situations, lawyers can attempt to
change clients’ behavior by relying on outside moral authority, moral dialogue, and
conscientious objection); see Stephen Pepper, Integrating Morality and Law in Legal
Practice: A Reply to Professor Simon, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1011, 1012 (2010) (“I
envision the lawyer as primarily a conduit for the law to the client, and morality as
modulating the application of available law by lawyer and client. . . . The client’s access to
and use of the law ought to be mediated, to some extent, through the moral sensibilities and
perception of the lawyer.”); cf. Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral
Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relations, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1062, 1066 (1976)
(emphasizing the importance of loyalty to the client and putting the client’s interests above
“the wider collectivity”).
77. Vischer, supra note 74, at 227 (arguing that the lawyer’s essential obligation is to
help the client achieve desired ends as long as the ends are within legal bounds based on a
good faith interpretation of what is permitted by the law); W. Bradley Wendel,
Professionalism as Interpretation, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1167, 1168–69 (2005) (explaining this
view); see, e.g., Kimberly Kirkland, Ethical Infrastructures and De Facto Ethical Norms at
Work in Large U.S. Law Firms: The Role of Ethics Counsel, 11 LEGAL ETHICS 181, 194
(2008) (“Some of the ethics counsel I interviewed see their role as limited to providing a
‘read’ on the likely ethics consequences of a particular course of action. Once they have
communicated their ‘read’, they step back and let others make the decision about how much
risk the firm will take.”); id. at 197 (“I view my role as ethics partner as objective
counselor—I don’t see myself as invoking morals.”) (quoting ethics counselor).
78. Kirkland, supra note 77, at 195 (stating that framing such decisions as ‘business
decisions’ is a tactical move that helps “the firm’s efforts to retain profitable partners and
attract lateral partners with lucrative books of business.”). For a discussion on framing, see
infra notes 311–17 and accompanying text.
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“amoral technician” who should strive to maximize any legal rights of the
client 79 without regard to the lawyer’s own moral viewpoint. 80 As Rhode
points out, “the claim that ‘it is not the lawyer’s role’” is an assertion, not
an argument, and begs the question at issue: What should that role be?”81
4. Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege
Arguably, in no area has the corporate lawyer’s role and the distinction
between law and business been more debated than in the attorney-client
privilege context. First, there is a long-standing dispute amongst scholars
about whether the attorney-client privilege should apply to corporations at
all, let alone to in-house counsel. For example, many scholars, like David
Luban, argue that the attorney-client privilege cannot justifiably be applied
to corporate entities. 82 They contend that a corporation’s business
professionals will still communicate openly and fully with corporate
counsel absent privilege protection because it is the only way to ensure
good business decisions. 83 Other scholars and courts claim the opposite—
that the attorney-client privilege is essential in the corporate context
because without it business professionals would not be open with their
attorneys, causing the latter to miss opportunities to persuade their clients,
ex ante, to comply with the law or social norms that may be legally
acceptable but socially or morally reprehensible. 84 Moreover, courts in
Europe have questioned specifically whether and to what degree the
79. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 (1983) (providing that
clients are “entitled to . . . seek any lawful objective through legally permissible means”).
The Model Code was replaced by the Model Rules in 1983. See Vischer, supra note 74, at
227 n.19 (“The Model Code was promulgated by the American Bar Association in 1970 and
adopted by all fifty-one jurisdictions, and the Model Rules were promulgated by the ABA in
1983 and displaced the Model Code in most states.”).
80. See generally Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues,
5 HUM. RTS. 1 (1975).
81. Rhode, supra note 66, at 1331.
82. See, e.g., DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 206–34 (1988)
(providing reasons why the privilege should not be applied to corporations).
83. See Vincent C. Alexander, The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege: A Study of the
Participants, 63 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 191, 222–28 (1989); Paul R. Rice, The Corporate
Attorney-Client Privilege: Loss of Predictability Does Not Justify Crying Wolfinbarger, 55
BUS. LAW. 735, 739–42 (2000).
84. See NXIVM Corp. v. O’Hara, 241 F.R.D. 109, 125 (N.D.N.Y. 2007) (“The free-flow
of information and the twin tributary of advice are the hallmarks of the privilege. For all of
this to occur, there must be a zone of safety for each to participate without apprehension that
such sensitive information and advice would be shared with others without their consent.”);
Hercules Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F. Supp. 136, 144 (D. Del. 1977) (“To the furnishing of
such advice the fullest freedom and honesty of communications of pertinent facts is a
prerequisite. To induce clients to make such communications, the privilege to prevent their
later disclosure is said by courts and commentators to be a necessity.” (quoting United States
v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358 (D. Mass. 1950))); Rostain, supra note
41, at 1426 (“[T]he importance of the attorney-client privilege is premised on its capacity to
further social values[,] . . . not only . . . to assist counsel in formulating legal advice . . . [but
also] to create a zone of privacy . . . to convince corporate clients to abide by the law.”
(internal quotation omitted)); id. at 1412–17 (explaining that the importance of a corporate
attorney-client privilege has decreased because it either fails to apply or is waived in more
and more situations).
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attorney-client privilege should apply to in-house counsel. 85 In the recent
Akzo Nobel Chemicals case before the European Union Court of Justice, the
Advocate General decided that the attorney-client privilege should not
apply to communications between in-house counsel and clients because as
employees of the corporate client, they are not sufficiently independent to
justify privilege protection. 86 Courts here in the U.S. have struggled with
this issue as well, 87 fearing that corporations would include in-house
attorneys in communications to later garner privilege protection and create a
zone of secrecy. 88 Because of this concern, when determining whether to
apply privilege protection to communications between in-house attorneys
and clients, U.S. courts often require a higher showing than when the
communication involves outside counsel.89
Scholars and courts also debate the extent to which the attorney-client
privilege should protect communications that contain mixed business and
legal advice. Currently, courts protect communications that mix business
and law as long as they are “made primarily for the purpose of generating
legal advice.” 90 Given this standard, unsurprisingly, courts attempt to
delineate what is legal from what is business advice. The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit recently furnished a typical example of this
delineation: “Fundamentally, legal advice involves the interpretation and
application of legal principles to guide future conduct or to assess past
conduct. It requires a lawyer to rely on legal education and experience to
inform judgment.” 91 But the problem with attempting to make such a
85. See Case C-550/07, Akzo Nobel Chems. Ltd. v. Comm’n, 2010 E.C.R. I-1 ¶ 1,
available at http://www.acc.com/advocacy/upload/AG-Opinion-AKZO-042910.pdf.
86. See id. ¶ 193.
87. See First Chi. Int’l v. United Exch. Co., 125 F.R.D. 55, 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1989);
Hercules, 434 F. Supp. at 143; see also Regan, Jr., supra note 32, at 202 (“The widely-noted
rise in the visibility and prestige of inside counsel in the last two decades or so has fueled the
continuing debate over the meaning of lawyers’ professional independence.”).
88. See First Chi. Int’l, 125 F.R.D. at 57; Hercules, 434 F. Supp. at 143.
89. See In re Sealed Case, 737 F.2d 94, 99 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Borase v. M/A COM, Inc.,
171 F.R.D. 10, 14 (D. Mass. 1997); McCaugherty v. Siffermann, 132 F.R.D. 234, 241 (N.D.
Cal. 1990); Elizabeth Chambliss, The Scope of In-Firm Privilege, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1721, 1727 (2005). This is generally because in-house counsel often hold legal and nonlegal positions at corporations. See Ann M. Murphy, Spin Control and the High-Profile
Client—Should the Attorney-Client Privilege Extend to Communications With Public
Relations Consultants?, 55 SYRACUSE L. REV. 545, 581 (2005) (“[S]ome courts . . . have
imposed a heavy burden on corporations seeking to protect communications with persons
holding dual legal/nonlegal rules.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted); Carl Pacini et
al., Accountants, Attorney-Client Privilege, and the Kovel Rule: Waiver Through
Inadvertent Disclosure Via Electronic Communication, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 893, 901 (2003);
Bufkin Alyse King, Comment, Preserving the Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate
Environment, 53 ALA. L. REV. 621, 623 (2002). For a complete discussion, see Beardslee,
supra note 44, at 751–53.
90. McCaugherty, 132 F.R.D. at 240; see also United States v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp.,
66 F.R.D. 154, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp.
357, 359 (D. Mass. 1950) (“[T]he privilege of nondisclosure is not lost merely because
relevant nonlegal considerations are expressly stated in a communication which also
includes legal advice.”).
91. In re Cnty. of Erie, 473 F.3d 413, 419–20 (2d. Cir. 2007) (internal citations omitted);
Ball v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., No. M8-85, 1989 WL 135903, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 1989)
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distinction, as the Second Circuit admitted, is that legal advice “is broader,
and is not demarcated by a bright line.” 92 Inevitably, the decision whether
to apply the attorney-client privilege may rest on the court’s view of the
role of the corporate attorney.
As will be discussed further in Part III, some courts have embraced the
expanding role of the corporate lawyer and accept that there are areas that
defy distinction between business and law in the attorney-client privilege
context.
These judges are willing to protect documents and/or
communications that straddle the divide. One such federal judge remarked:
The complete lawyer may well promote and reinforce the legal advice
given, weigh it, and lay out its ramifications by explaining: how the
advice is feasible and can be implemented; the legal downsides, risks and
costs of taking the advice or doing otherwise; what alternatives exist to
present measures or the measures advised; what other persons are doing
or thinking about the matter; or the collateral benefits, risks or costs in
terms of expense, politics, insurance, commerce, morals, and appearances.
So long as the predominant purpose of the communication is legal advice,
these considerations and caveats are not other than legal advice or
severable from it. 93

Other judges, however, are not as open to this view. Although these judges
recognize that “[a]ttorneys frequently give to their clients business or other
advice,” they attempt to separate the business from the “essentially
professional legal services” 94 and contend that “[w]hen an attorney is
consulted in a capacity other than as a lawyer, as (for example) a policy
advisor, media expert, business consultant, banker, referee or friend, that
consultation is not privileged.” 95
The debate over the corporate attorney’s role is also erupting in the
doctrine addressing the extent to which courts should protect
communications between attorneys, clients, and third-party consultants.96
Those who argue that the corporate attorney-client privilege should be
applied to communications with third party consultants in situations where
the consultant is not merely serving as a translator argue for a broadened

(reasoning that legal advice “involve[s] the judgment of a lawyer in his capacity as a
lawyer”).
92. In re Cnty. of Erie, 473 F.3d at 420; see McCaugherty, 132 F.R.D. at 238; United
Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. at 359 (stating that the modern-day lawyer advises his client
on what is both permissible and desirable, involving several subjects, and that privilege is
not nullified just because of the presence of nonlegal considerations in a legal
communication). For this reason, scholars like Gregory Sisk and Pamela Abbate have
sought to find an alternative test to determine when the corporate attorney-client privilege
should apply. See Sisk & Abbate, supra note 9, at 221 (recommending a “genuine and
material legal purpose test” by which the privilege should attach if “the request for legal
advice or assistance was ‘genuine’ and the legal dimension was ‘material’”).
93. In re Cnty. of Erie, 473 F.3d at 420.
94. Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 638 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951
(1963).
95. In re Cnty. of Erie, 473 F.3d at 421 (citing In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d 1100, 1106 (D.C.
Cir. 1998)).
96. See generally Beardslee, supra note 44.
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view of the corporate attorney. 97 The converse is also true: those who
argue that the corporate attorney-client privilege should not be applied to
communications with third party consultants unless they are merely serving
as translators support a more narrow view of the role of the corporate
attorney. 98
5. Summary
When looked at in combination, these four areas exemplify a tension
between those that view corporate practice more expansively and
holistically and those that take a more narrow view and believe there can
and should be a demarcation between law and other disciplines, i.e.,
between legal counseling and business, moral, or political counseling. At
present, an easy solution to this debate is unimaginable. However, this
debate, which attempts to draw a line between law and other disciplines,
particularly law and business, has no business in the work product context.
Before delving into why this is so, the next section provides a general
overview of the work product doctrine including its history and general
configuration.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE WORK PRODUCT DOCTRINE
Although this part is generally devoted to providing a brief history of the
work product doctrine and an overview of how it is applied in federal court
today, 99 it also seeks to highlight some of the aspects of the work product
doctrine that illustrate the growing debate about the corporate attorney’s
role and that support this Article’s ultimate recommendations.100

97. See, e.g., Steven B. Hantler et al., Extending the Privilege to Litigation
Communications Specialists in the Age of Trial by Media, 13 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 7, 9
(2004) (arguing that attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine should extend to
litigation communication specialists—as opposed to regular public relations consultants—in
the context of high profile corporate litigation); Douglas R. Richmond, The Attorney-Client
Privilege and Associated Confidentiality Concerns in the Post-Enron Era, 110 PENN ST. L.
REV. 381 (2005) (documenting the numerous instances that result in a narrow construction of
the attorney-client privilege and how this impedes the provision of legal assistance); Kim J.
Gruetzmacher, Comment, Privileged Communications With Accountants: The Demise of
United States v. Kovel, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 977, 994 (2003) (contending that attorneys need to
have confidential communications with accountants to provide competent legal advice to
clients about complex financial transactions, especially around tax shelters).
98. See Murphy, supra note 89, at 590, 591 (arguing that communications with PR
consultants should not be protected).
99. For a more complete history of the work product doctrine, see Jeff A. Anderson et
al., Special Project, The Work Product Doctrine, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 760, 764–88 (1983);
Pease-Wingenter, supra note 2, at 125–40.
100. That said, this part assumes, in large part, that the reader is familiar with the general
contours of the work product doctrine and the attorney-client privilege.
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A. Brief History of the Work Product Doctrine
The birth of the modern work product doctrine traces back to 1937.101 In
that year, the newly crafted Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP)
included broad discovery provisions that for the first time permitted
attorneys to use discovery devices to learn about their adversary’s case.102
Although many courts assumed protection should continue for trial
preparation materials, those materials were not explicitly protected from
disclosure under the new Rules. 103 This eventually led to disagreement
among the courts as to the appropriate scope of protection for materials
made in preparation for trial.104 The Advisory Committee to the FRCP
drafted a revision to the rules to help clear up the confusion,105 but near the
same time the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to Hickman v.
Taylor, 106 the case that is credited as having first introduced the work
product doctrine. 107
Hickman involved the sinking of a tugboat that resulted in the death of
five of the nine crew members. 108 The attorney representing the tugboat
owner, “with an eye toward the anticipated litigation,” conducted private
interviews of survivors and witnesses. 109 The attorney for a representative
of one of the deceased crewmembers sought discovery of these
interviews. 110 The lower court ordered the tugboat attorney to disclose to
his opponent all witness statements along with any written memoranda
summarizing the oral statements. 111 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit reversed, holding that the requested materials were “work
product of the lawyer” and, therefore protected.112
101. Anderson et al., supra note 99, at 766, 769–71; see also Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing
Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Background of the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39
B.C. L. REV. 691, 729 & n.216 (1998) (noting that the discovery rules articulated in the
Federal Rules were effectively in their final form as of April 2007, prior to the final
submission in November 2007).
102. Anderson et al., supra note 99, at 769–71; Pease-Wingenter, supra note 2, at 125–26
(explaining that prior to the adoption of the FRCP “there was not a need for work product
doctrine protection because discovery devices . . . did not permit the disclosure of the
adversary’s case.”).
103. Pease-Wingenter, supra note 2, at 126.
104. Anderson et al., supra note 99, at 771.
105. ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES FOR CIV. PROC., PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS TO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED
STATES 43 (1944) (proposing first draft of an amendment); ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES FOR
CIV. PROC., SECOND PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES 38–40 (1945) (proposing
second draft of an amendment); see also Anderson et al., supra note 99, at 772–73.
106. 329 U.S. 495 (1947); see Anderson et al., supra note 99, at 771–72.
107. Pease-Wingenter, supra note 2, at 125–26.
108. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 498.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 498–99.
111. Hickman v. Taylor, 4 F.R.D. 479, 483 (E.D. Pa. 1945) (en banc); see also Hickman,
329 U.S. at 499–500.
112. Hickman v. Taylor, 153 F.2d 212, 223 (3d Cir. 1945) (internal quotations omitted)
(defining work product as “intangible things, the results of the lawyer’s use of his tongue, his
pen, and his head, for his client”).

1892

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

The Supreme Court largely agreed with the Third Circuit’s definition of
work product 113 and held that the requested materials did not have to be
turned over because the request was for “written statements, private
memoranda and personal recollections prepared or formed by an adverse
party’s counsel in the course of his legal duties” that were “without [any]
purported necessity or justification.” 114 This type of “inquiry[] into the
files and the mental impressions of the attorney,” the Court explained,
“contravenes the public policy underlying the orderly prosecution and
defense of legal claims.” 115 According to the Court, the “orderly
prosecution and defense of legal claims” requires attorneys to both
“promote justice and to protect their clients’ interests.” 116 Essential to the
“[p]roper preparation of a client’s case” is an environment in which
attorneys can “assemble information, sift what [they] consider[] to be the
relevant from the irrelevant facts, prepare [their] legal theories and plan
[their] strategy without undue and needless interference” by the opposing
side. 117 The Court was concerned that without such protection of these
intangible and tangible outputs, attorneys would fail to put things in writing
or would free-ride on the other sides’ work which would be
“demoralizing.” 118 The Court further worried that the overall impact of
such behavior would be that “the interests of the clients and the cause of
justice would be poorly served.” 119 The Court was clear, however, that not
all work product was alike and that not “all written materials obtained or
prepared by an adversary’s counsel with an eye toward litigation are
necessarily free from discovery in all cases.” 120 Upon a showing of
extreme necessity or hardship, a party could access the ordinary work
product of an attorney such as “written statements secured from
witnesses.” 121 But “oral statements made by witnesses . . . whether

113. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511 (“This work is reflected, of course, in interviews,
statements, memoranda, correspondence, briefs, mental impressions, personal beliefs, and
countless other tangible and intangible ways—aptly though roughly termed by the Circuit
Court of Appeals in this case as the ‘work product of the lawyer.’”). The Court, however,
did not deem work product to be an extension of the privilege, but instead appeared to view
work product as its own protective doctrine. See id. at 510 n.9 (explaining that its view is
different than the English concept of privilege); see also Anderson et al., supra note 99, at
775.
114. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 510; see also id. at 515–16 (Jackson, J., concurring)
(explaining that although “discovery should provide a party access to anything that is
evidence in his case,” here “the demand is not for the production of a transcript in existence
but calls for the creation of a written statement not in being. But the statement by counsel of
what a witness told him is not evidence when written. Plaintiff could not introduce it to
prove his case.”).
115. Id. at 510 (majority opinion).
116. Id. at 510–11.
117. Id. at 511.
118. Id.
119. Id.; see also id. at 516 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“Discovery was hardly intended to
enable a learned profession to perform its functions either without wits or on wits borrowed
from the adversary.”).
120. Id. at 511 (majority opinion).
121. Id. at 512.
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presently in the form of his mental impressions or memoranda” receive
heightened protection.122
The Hickman decision created some confusion. 123 First, courts debated
what the decision defined as the real scope of work product protection. As
mentioned above, the Hickman Court emphasized the need to protect
materials “with an eye toward litigation” 124 or materials entailed in the
“[p]roper preparation of a client’s case.” 125 Thus, in 1970, the Advisory
Committee to the FRCP sought to codify and clarify the Hickman work
product doctrine in Rule 26(b)(3).126 Second, Hickman left unclear whether
work product protection was limited to the work product only of lawyers.127
The 1970 version of the rule defined “eye toward litigation” 128 and
materials in “proper preparation of a client’s case” 129 as materials
“prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial.” 130 It stated that work
122. Id. Since this decision, courts and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) have
sought to more clearly identify the two types of work product hinted at in Hickman:
ordinary and opinion work product. See, e.g., FED R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(B) (distinguishing
“mental impressions, . . . opinions, or legal theories” of an attorney from other types of work
product and implying that they should receive increased protection); In re Steinhardt
Partners, L.P., 9 F.3d 230, 234 (2d Cir. 1993) (“An attorney’s protected thought processes
include preparing legal theories, planning litigation strategies and trial tactics, and sifting
through information.”); In re Doe, 662 F.2d 1073, 1076 n.2 (4th Cir. 1981) (finding that
ordinary work product “refer[s] to those documents prepared by the attorney which do not
contain the mental impressions, conclusions or opinions of the attorney. ‘Opinion work
product’ is work product that contains those fruits of the attorney’s mental processes.”); In re
Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1657-L, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23164, at *8–9 (E.D.
La. Mar. 5, 2007) (“Moreover, work-product which is based on oral statements from
witnesses is entitled to ‘special protection’ and is discoverable only in a ‘rare situation’
because such materials ‘are so much a product of the lawyer’s thinking.’” (citations
omitted)); Haugh v. Schroder Inv. Mgmt. N. Am., Inc., No. 02 CIV. 7955 (DLC), 2003 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 14586, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2003) (“Attorney work product can thus
conceptually be divided into two classes: that which recites factual matters and that which
reflects the attorney’s opinions, conclusions, mental impressions or legal theories. A
heightened standard of protection must be accorded ‘opinion’ work product that reveals an
attorney’s mental impressions and legal theories.”).
123. Highlighted here is confusion from Hickman that is most relevant to this Article.
However, the opinion also left confusion around the requisite showing of necessity. See 1970
COMMENTS TO FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 26, available at
http://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcp/ACRule26.htm; Anderson et al., supra note 99, at 780;
Pease-Wingenter, supra note 2, at 131–32.
124. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511.
125. Id. at 511–12 (emphasizing the general policy against invading the privacy of an
attorney’s course of preparation).
126. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3); FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note, 48 F.R.D.
487, 499–500 (1970); Pease-Wingenter, supra note 2, at 134–36.
127. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note, 48 F.R.D. 487, 499–500 (1970)
(citing cases with contradictory holdings and explaining that “[t]he courts are divided as to
whether the work-product doctrine extends to the preparatory work only of lawyers. The
Hickman case left this issue open since the statements in that case were taken by a lawyer.”);
Anderson et al., supra note 99, at 780; Pease-Wingenter, supra note 2, at 131–32.
128. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511.
129. Id. (emphasis added); id. at 512 (emphasizing the general policy against invading the
privacy of an attorney’s course of preparation) (emphasis added).
130. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3) (emphasis added). Note that the terms “litigation” and
“trial” have been interpreted to apply to administrative proceedings and arbitration. PeaseWingenter, supra note 2, at 138–39 (explaining that “the key requirement seems to be that
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product protection applies to materials created for trial and because of
anticipated litigation, but was not limited to those materials that help the
attorney prepare the client’s actual trial. 131 Thus, it made clear that the
words “case” and “litigation” encompassed more than just “trial.” 132 True,
their reach was not limitless. The advisory committee’s notes from the
1970 amendment to the FRCP state that “[m]aterials assembled in the
ordinary course of business, or pursuant to public requirements unrelated to
litigation, or for other nonlitigation purposes are not” included.133 That
said, the original rule was broad.
To that end, in that first rendition of the rule (and in the version of the
rule today), the work product doctrine extended to materials “prepared in
anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that
other party’s representative (including his attorney, consultant, surety,
indemnitor, insurer, or agent).” 134 Thus, according to the 1970 version, one
could successfully argue that materials produced by non-lawyers for a
party—even when not directed by the attorney—could be protected.135
Unsurprisingly, as will be discussed below, the differences between the
case law and the codified rule have spawned debate and disagreement
among the circuits on the scope of work product protection today.
B. The Work Product Doctrine Today
Before moving to examples of the application of the work product
doctrine to work related to PR, this section attempts to first summarize what
most courts agree is the scope of the work product doctrine based on case
law and interpretation of the FRCP 136 and second, to outline the general
areas of debate in the literature and case law about the work product
doctrine’s coverage.

the materials are prepared in anticipation of an adversarial setting”). See infra notes 138 and
313.
131. For further discussion of the “because of” standard, see infra Part III.B.
132. See Pease-Wingenter, supra note 2, at 154 (explaining that the word “‘litigation’ has
a much broader meaning than ‘trial’”).
133. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note, 48 F.R.D. 487, 501 (1970).
134. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3) (emphasis added).
135. The 1970 version of the rule also defined what type of showing is required to
overcome work product protection. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note, 48 F.R.D.
487, 499 (1970); Anderson et al., supra note 99, at 783.
136. In determining work product application, courts look to Hickman, FRCP 26(b)(3),
and Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 16(b)(2). RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 87 cmt. e (2000) (“In the federal system, work-product immunity is
recognized both under Rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and as a
common-law rule following the decision in Hickman v. Taylor. In a few states work-product
immunity is established by common law, but in most states it is defined by statute or court
rule.”).
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1. The Basics
a. What the Work Product Doctrine Generally Protects
In a nutshell, the work product doctrine protects intangible and tangible
materials 137 from discovery that are developed in preparation of a client’s
case or to prepare for trial or some other adversarial proceeding.138
According to the FRCP, these materials can be “prepared by or for a

137. FRCP 16(b)(3) states that work product protection only applies to tangible materials
and documents; however, it has been applied to protect intangible work product as well. See,
e.g., FED. R. EVID. 502(g)(2) (“‘[W]ork-product protection’ means the protection that
applicable law provides for tangible material (or its intangible equivalent) prepared in
anticipation of litigation or for trial.”); In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 343 F.3d 658, 662
(3d Cir. 2003) (“It is clear from Hickman that work product protection extends to both
tangible and intangible work product.”); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 473 F.2d 840, 848
(8th Cir. 1973) (providing absolute protection to personal recollections, notes and
memoranda related to attorney’s discussion with witnesses). Indeed, Hickman’s definition
of work product included intangible items among the three types of materials to be protected:
signed statements, interview memoranda, and attorney recollection. Hickman v. Taylor, 329
U.S. 495, 511–12 (1947); Anderson et al., supra note 99, at 841 (explaining that Hickman
applied protection to intangibles and that “[b]ecause the 1970 amendment did not codify the
Hickman treatment of intangible materials, the Hickman decision continues to govern the
standards for unrecorded work product protection.”). The Restatement also states that work
product protection applies to both intangible and tangible materials. RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 87(1) (2000) (“Work product consists of tangible
material or its intangible equivalent in unwritten or oral form, other than underlying facts,
prepared by a lawyer for litigation then in progress or in reasonable anticipation of future
litigation.”). Interestingly, FRCP 26 does not exempt intangible materials, largely reflecting
“the fact that the underlying standard of Rule 26(b)(1) permits discovery of ‘books,
documents, or other tangible things.’” Pease-Wingenter, supra note 2, at 134. Courts have
offered an array of justifications for protecting intangible materials: “Requiring an attorney
to give his or her personal recollection of those interviews would create as great or greater
threat to disclosing his thoughts, opinions and strategy as would disclosure of his written
notes reflecting those interviews.” Dist. Council of New York City, 1992 WL 208284, at *7;
accord Appeal of Hughes, 633 F.2d 282, 290 (3d Cir. 1980) (explaining that recollections of
attorney’s agent may reveal attorney’s mental processes). That said, some state courts
“confine absolute work product protection to written material reflecting the attorney’s
personal mental impressions and legal theories.” Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Applicability
of the Attorney-Client Privilege to Non-Testifying Experts: Reestablishing the Boundaries
Between the Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work Product Protection, 68 WASH. U. L.Q.
19, 21 (1990) (stating that work product does not protect communications between attorneys
and non-testifying experts in many states); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 87 cmt. f (2000) (“Tangible materials include documents,
photographs, diagrams, sketches, questionnaires and surveys, financial and economic
analyses, hand-written notes, and material in electronic and other technologically advanced
forms, such as stenographic, mechanical, or electronic recordings or transmissions, computer
data bases, tapes, and printouts. Intangible work product is equivalent work product in
unwritten, oral or remembered form. For example, intangible work product can come into
question by a discovery request for a lawyer’s recollections derived from oral
communications.”).
138. However, some state courts confine “litigation” to refer “only to court proceedings”
and, therefore, do not consider materials prepared for proceedings before an administrative
agency that utilizes “quasi-judicial procedures” as being prepared for “litigation” even after
the administrative proceedings have begun. See, e.g., Flores v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 777
S.W.2d 38, 40 (Tex. 1989).
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representative of a party, including his or her agent.” 139 The work product
doctrine protects both opinion work product and non-opinion work
product, 140 but protection for opinion work product is greater than that for
non-opinion work product. 141 To gain access to non-opinion work product,
the party seeking the information must show a substantial need for the
document and undue hardship or prejudice that would result if they are
denied such access. 142 For opinion work product, however, the party
seeking access must make a much more persuasive showing. 143
b. Work Product Versus the Attorney-Client Privilege 144
Although courts consider the work product doctrine to be “distinct from
and broader than the attorney-client privilege,” 145 the two doctrines are
often “inseparable twin issues” because “[w]henever the attorney-client
privilege is raised in on-going litigation, concomitantly the work product
doctrine is virtually omnipresent.” 146 Thus, understanding how the
attorney-client privilege both differs from and overlaps with the work
product doctrine, is crucial to any analysis of the appropriate scope of one
or the other.
Although the work product doctrine and the attorney-client privilege are
strongly allied, they have different purposes and are justified on different
public policy grounds. 147 According to many federal courts, the purpose of
the work product doctrine is to create a “zone of privacy in which a lawyer
139. Occidental Chem. Corp. v. OHM Remediation Servs. Corp., 175 F.R.D. 431, 434
(W.D.N.Y. 1997); see also NXIVM Corp. v. O’Hara, 241 F.R.D. 109, 128 (N.D.N.Y. 2007)
(“[P]repared by or for a party, or by or for his representative, may be cloaked by this
doctrine as well.”); In re Copper Mkt. Antitrust Litig., 200 F.R.D. 213, 221 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
140. See NXIVM Corp., 241 F.R.D. at 126–27; see also supra note 122 (describing the
two types of work product). For a detailed explanation of the types of work product and
requisite showing to pierce work product protection, see generally Anderson et al., supra
note 99.
141. See NXIVM Corp., 241 F.R.D. at 126–27 (“At a minimum, such ‘opinion’ work
product should remain protected until and unless a highly persuasive showing is made.”); see
also In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 219 F.3d 175, 190–91 (2d Cir. 2000); Haugh v. Schroder
Inv. Mgmt. N. Am., Inc., No. 02 CIV. 7955 (DLC), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14586, at *14
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2003).
142. See NXIVM Corp., 241 F.R.D. at 126–27.
143. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 512 (1947) (“[T]he general policy against
invading the privacy of an attorney’s course of preparation is so well recognized and so
essential to an orderly working of our system of legal procedure that a burden rests on the
one who would invade that privacy to establish adequate reasons to justify production
through a subpoena or court order.”); NXIVM Corp., 241 F.R.D. at 126–27.
144. This section only highlights the differences that are relevant to the subject of this
Article. An example of another difference is that the attorney-client privilege is not a federal
rule of civil procedure, and therefore the state’s attorney-client privilege law applies when
dealing with a state law issue. NXIVM Corp., 241 F.R.D. at 124.
145. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 n.11 (1975).
146. NXIVM Corp., 241 F.R.D. at 126; see also Beardslee, supra note 44, at 755 n.146
(Resultantly, courts are often imprecise when applying the two doctrines, relying on one to
support the other” and claiming that “[s]ome [courts] use work-product to side-step attorneyclient privilege issues”).
147. See Hercules Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F. Supp. 136, 150–51 (D. Del. 1977).
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can prepare and develop legal theories and strategy ‘with an eye toward
litigation,’ free from unnecessary intrusion by his adversaries.” 148 As one
court explained:
the purpose of the work product privilege is to prevent a potential
adversary from gaining an unfair advantage over a party by obtaining
documents prepared by the party or its counsel in anticipation of
litigation which may reveal the party’s strategy or the party’s own
assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of its case. 149

The purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to encourage complete and
frank discussion so that the lawyer can provide the client with fully
informed, competent advice and assist the client in complying with the
law. 150 Thus, the work product doctrine directly promotes the integrity of
the adversary system, as opposed to the attorney-client privilege which only
does so indirectly by protecting communications and encouraging full
disclosure, thereby supporting the health and integrity of the attorney-client
relationship, an integral component of the adversary system. 151
In keeping with their purposes, the two doctrines protect different types
of information and communication.152 For the most part, the attorney-client
privilege only protects those communications between lawyers and clients

148. United States v. Adlman (Adlman II), 134 F.3d 1194, 1196 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting
Hickman, 329 U.S. at 510–11); see Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511 (noting that without such
protection, “[i]nefficiency, unfairness and sharp practices would inevitably develop in the
giving of legal advice and in the preparation of cases for trial. The effect on the legal
profession would be demoralizing. And the interests of the clients and the cause of justice
would be poorly served.”); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 265 F. Supp. 2d 321, 332 (S.D.N.Y.
2003); Haugh v. Schroder Inv. Mgmt. N. Am., Inc., No. 02 CIV. 7955 (DLC), 2003 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 14586, at *12–13 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2003) (“The [work product] doctrine
protects a lawyer’s ability to prepare his client’s case, protects against the disclosure of the
attorney’s mental impressions, conclusions, strategies, or theories, and also avoids the
unfairness that would occur if one party were allowed to appropriate the work of another.”).
149. United States v. Textron Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 138, 152 (D.R.I. 2007), overruled on
other grounds, 577 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2009); see infra note 229 and accompanying text.
150. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
151. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Phil. (Westinghouse II), 951 F.2d
1414, 1428 (3d Cir. 1991); United States v. AT&T, 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980);
Hercules, 434 F. Supp. at 150 (“‘The purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to encourage
full disclosure of information between an attorney and his client by guaranteeing the
inviolability of their confidential communications. The ‘work product of the attorney’, on
the other hand, is accorded protection for the purpose of preserving our adversary system of
litigation by assuring an attorney that his private files shall, except in unusual circumstances,
remain free from the encroachments of opposing counsel.’” (quoting Scourtes v. Fred W.
Albrecht Grocery Co., 15 F.R.D. 55, 58 (N.D. Ohio 1953))); see also United States v. Zolin,
491 U.S. 554, 562 (1989) (defining the central purpose of the privilege as “‘encourag[ing]
full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients’” (quoting Upjohn Co. v.
United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981))).
152. There are some similarities of course. Like the attorney-client privilege, the work
product doctrine does not protect non-privileged facts. NXIVM Corp., 241 F.R.D. at 127;
Adlman II, 134 F.3d at 1197 (noting that in most instances an attorney’s work product
“receive[s] special protection not accorded to factual material”). Also, the determination of
whether either doctrine applies is done on a case-by-case basis. Republic of the Philippines
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. (Westinghouse I), 132 F.R.D. 384, 389 (D.N.J. 1990).
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geared toward garnering legal advice. 153 Although courts will protect
communications that mix business and law, 154 “[w]hen an attorney is
consulted in a capacity other than as a lawyer, as (for example) a policy
advisor, media expert, business consultant, banker, referee or friend, that
consultation is not privileged.” 155 Thus, the attorney-client privilege
doctrine always requires courts to make the tenuous distinction between
legal and business advice in the corporate context. The work product
doctrine, on the other hand, arguably does not. It protects work produced in
anticipation of litigation or for trial regardless of whether those materials
contain legal advice or are primarily for the provision of legal advice.156
This is true under both work product tests. If the work was created
“because of” anticipated litigation or for trial or if the primary motivation
behind it was to assist in pending or anticipated litigation, it is protected. 157
The work product doctrine is generally designed to be less easily waived
than is the attorney-client privilege. 158 Although there are a few key
exceptions, for the most part, the attorney-client privilege does not apply or
is considered waived when information, otherwise confidential, is shared
with third parties. 159 This is because one of the primary reasons for the
attorney-client privilege is to promote the exchange of information between
attorney and client.160 If that information is easily shared with a third party,

153. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 121 F. Supp. 792, 794 (D. Del. 1954)
(“When he acts as an advisor, the attorney must give predominantly legal advice to retain his
client’s privilege of non-disclosure, not solely, or even largely, business advice.”); see also
McCaugherty v. Siffermann, 132 F.R.D. 234, 238 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (explaining that the
communication must be “made primarily for the purpose of generating legal advice” in order
for the attorney-client privilege to apply).
154. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 359 (D. Mass. 1950)
(“[T]he privilege of nondisclosure is not lost merely because relevant nonlegal
considerations are expressly stated in a communication which also includes legal advice.”);
cf. United States v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 66 F.R.D. 206, 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
155. In re Cnty. of Erie, 473 F.3d 413, 421 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d
1100, 1106 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (noting that in instances where attorneys consult on non-legal
matters, those consultations are not privileged)); Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 638
(2d Cir. 1962) (“Attorneys frequently give to their clients business or other advice which, at
least insofar as it can be separated from their essentially professional legal services, gives
rise to no privilege whatever.”).
156. See supra note 137 and accompanying text. For a more complete description of
what the work product covers and how it is applied, see infra Parts II.B.2, III.
157. See infra Part II.B.2. That said, as will be explored further, the work product
doctrine enables courts to determine protection based on a distinction between law and
business, that is, whether the work was for legal as opposed to business purposes. See infra
notes 310–311 and accompanying text.
158. See Westinghouse I, 132 F.R.D. 384, 389 (D.N.J. 1990). However, “[t]he privilege
derived from the work product doctrine is not absolute.” United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S.
225, 239 (1975).
159. See Cavallaro v. United States, 284 F.3d 236, 246 (1st Cir. 2002); cf. United States
v. Textron Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 138, 152 (D.R.I. 2007), overruled on other grounds, 577
F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2009). There are, however, two exceptions—for a detailed discussion and
analysis of these exceptions, see Beardslee, supra note 44, at 744–51.
160. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 390–93 (1981); Westinghouse I, 132
F.R.D. at 388.
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then the need for and expectation of confidentiality disappears. 161 The
opposite is true of the work product doctrine. The work product doctrine is
primarily intended to protect work product from disclosure to a party’s
adversaries—not third parties whose expertise may prove helpful to the
attorney in analyzing the strength and weaknesses of his/her case and
developing case strategies and theories. Thus, most courts hold that waiver
occurs only when disclosure enables access to the confidential information
by an adversary. 162 As courts have explained, “[a] disclosure made in the
pursuit of such trial preparation, and not inconsistent with maintaining
secrecy against opponents, should be allowed without waiver of the
privilege.” 163 This is because
impressions and strategies are not always created in a vacuum, but, rather
are generated in cogent discourse with others, including the clients and
agents. Further, the exchange of such documents and ideas with those
whose expertise and knowledge of certain facts can help the attorney in
the assessment of any aspect of the litigation does not invoke a waiver of
the doctrine. 164

Thus, the doctrine “is an intensely practical one, grounded in the realities of
litigation in our adversary system. One of those realities is that attorneys
often must rely on the assistance of investigators and other agents in the
compilation of materials in preparation for trial.”165 Indeed, work product
can be shown to others “simply because there [is] some good reason to
show it” without compromising its work product status. 166

161. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 508 (1947) (explaining that waiver occurs because
there is no expectation of confidentiality); see Westinghouse II, 951 F.2d 1414, 1424 (3d Cir.
1991).
162. See Westinghouse II, 951 F.2d at 1428 (citing U.S. v. AT&T, 642 F.2d 1285, 1299
(D.C. Cir. 1980)); Textron, 507 F. Supp. 2d at 152 (“The [attorney-client] privilege . . . is
designed to protect confidentiality, so that any disclosure outside the magic circle is
inconsistent with the privilege; by contrast, work product protection is provided against
‘adversaries,’ so only disclosing material in a way inconsistent with keeping it from an
adversary waives work product protection.” (quoting United States v. Mass. Inst. of Tech.,
129 F.3d 681, 687 (1st Cir. 1997))); Gutter v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., No. 95-CV2152, 1998 WL 2017926, at *3 (S.D. Fla. May 18, 1998) (“While disclosure to outside
auditors may waive the attorney-client privilege, it does not waive the work product
privilege.”); 8 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2024 (3d
ed. 2010) (citing cases)). But see Russo v. Cabot Corp., No. 01-2613, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
23861, at *6–9 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 26, 2001) (applying the common interest doctrine and the
same waiver analysis); id. at *7 n.6 (“While the cases deal with attorney-client privilege and
not specifically with the work product doctrine, we see no reason to treat these principles
differently for purposes of waiver.”).
163. AT&T, 642 F.2d at 1299.
164. NXIVM Corp. v. O’Hara, 241 F.R.D. 109, 128 (N.D.N.Y. 2007).
165. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238–39 (1975). For a discussion of whether
or not the work product doctrine protects materials actually created by these third parties
either under the direction of the attorney or independently, see infra Part II.B.2.c.
166. Adlman II, 134 F.3d 1194, 1200 n.4 (2d Cir. 1998). This is not true, however, for
testifying experts. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4) (explaining that such testifying experts can be
deposed). But see NXIVM Corp., 241 F.R.D. at 138 (“In fact, in most respects, the discussion
of a third party waiver is virtually the same for both the attorney-client privilege and the
work product doctrine. A voluntary disclosure of work product, for some or any
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One large difference between the two doctrines, aside from the temporal
restrictions around application of the work product doctrine, is that the
work product doctrine has an escape hatch that the attorney-client privilege
does not. 167 As mentioned above, work product protection can be pierced
with certain showings of need. 168 The attorney-client privilege is
considered a rule of substance and therefore the state’s attorney-client
privilege rules apply in federal court when jurisdiction is based on diversity
of the parties. 169 The work product doctrine, however, is a rule of the
FRCP, and, therefore, it is universally applied in federal court regardless of
whether federal jurisdiction is based on diversity of the parties or a federal
question. Unfortunately, however, this universality has not produced a
uniform standard or application of the work product rule. 170 It is to these
differences that this Article turns next.
2. General Area of Debate: “In Anticipation of Litigation” or “Preparation
for Trial”
As mentioned above, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure state that work
product protection applies to work “prepared in anticipation of litigation or
for trial.” 171 But what this exactly means is unclear. Put simply, to
determine if work product applies, courts generally ask three questions. 172

inexplicable benefit, to a third party, especially if the party is an adversary, may waive the
immunity.”).
167. However, in some state courts, attorney-client privilege protection is not absolute
and can be overcome with the requisite showing of need, relevance, and hardship. See, e.g.,
Leonen v. Johns-Manville, 135 F.R.D. 94, 100 (D.N.J. 1990) (applying state law); Payton v.
N.J. Tpk. Auth., 678 A.2d 279, 288 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) (“The [attorney-client]
privilege may be pierced upon a showing of need, relevance and materiality, and the fact that
the information could not be secured from any less intrusive source.”).
168. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
169. FED. R. EVID. 501; Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 32 F.3d 851, 861
(3d Cir. 1994) (noting that Pennsylvania law applies insofar as the “Federal Rules of
Evidence 501 and 1101(c) provide that we should apply state law in determining the extent
and scope of the attorney-client privilege”); Russo v. Cabot Corp., No. 01-2613, 2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 23861, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 26, 2001).
170. Evidently, there is little uniformity across state courts as well. Work product
protection in some state courts is narrower. For example, in New York, work product is
protected only when the item was “prepared exclusively for litigation.” Agovino v. Taco
Bell, 225 A.D.2d 569, 571 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996). Additionally, some state courts only
provide absolute protection for tangible documents that reflect an attorney’s mental
impressions or legal theories. Imwinkelried, supra note 137, at 21–22 (explaining that work
product does not protect communications between attorneys and non-testifying experts in a
minority of states). Other states apply the work-product doctrine to unconditionally protect
attorneys’ “impressions, conclusions, [and] opinions” that are written down. Williamson v.
Superior Court of L.A. Cnty., 582 P.2d 126, 129 (Cal. 1978) (“Accordingly, [the California
Code of Civil Procedure] affords a conditional or qualified protection for work product
generally, and an absolute protection as to an attorney’s impressions and conclusions.”).
171. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3).
172. As will be apparent from the description below, these three questions are not
necessarily each addressed by every court and, sometimes the questions morph into one
another. But generally, these are the three questions that, either alone or in combination, are
asked by courts to help make the work product determination. The larger question may be
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First, there is the question of timing: at what point is litigation
sufficiently probable that materials are prepared in anticipation of it?
Second, courts look to what motivated the development of the work—
whether it was conducted because of, or was primarily motivated by the
pending litigation or upcoming trial.173 Third, and often considered along
with the second inquiry, courts ask if the work for which protection is
sought would have been prepared in the ordinary course of business. 174
a. Temporal Question
Courts recognize that the work product doctrine can protect material that
parties prepare even before they file a lawsuit. 175 That said, when the
possibility of litigation is remote, courts do not consider material to be
prepared in anticipation of litigation.176 Nor does “[t]he mere fact that
litigation does eventually ensue . . . by itself, cloak materials prepared by an
attorney with the protection of the work product privilege.” 177 Instead,
courts require that the litigation be objectively “likely” or “foreseeable.”178
what is the theory behind litigation—a question the Author intends to address at a later day
in a forthcoming article.
173. As will be discussed further infra, these are actually two different standards:
“because of” and “primarily motivated by.”
174. The original Advisory Committee notes to FRCP 26(b)(3) stated that “[m]aterials
assembled in the ordinary course of business, or pursuant to public requirements unrelated to
litigation, or for other nonlitigation purposes are not under the qualified immunity provided
by [the rule].” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3) advisory committee notes (1970 amendments); cf.
Amway Corp. v. Proctor & Gamble Co., No. 1:98-CV-726, 2001 WL 1818698, at *6 (W.D.
Mich. Apr. 3, 2001) (“The concept of “anticipation of litigation” embodies both a temporal
and motivational aspect.”).
175. In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1657-L, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23164, at
*9 (E.D. La. Mar. 5, 2007) (noting that “the existence of litigation is not a prerequisite”); see
also Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 401–02 (1981) (applying work product
protection even though at the time the documents were prepared, there were no threatened
proceedings against the company); In re Sealed Case, 146 F.3d 881, 886 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(applying the work product doctrine despite the fact that when the document was prepared
no claim had been filed); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1229 (3d Cir. 1979)
(explaining that work product protection “extends to material prepared or collected before
litigation actually commences”). Indeed, there is no requirement that a specific claim be
made or even contemplated. In re Sealed Case, 146 F.3d at 887 (holding that “where, as
here, lawyers claim they advised clients regarding the risks of potential litigation, the
absence of a specific claim represents just one factor that courts should consider in
determining whether the work-product privilege applies”).
176. See Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 604 (8th Cir. 1977)
(explaining that the “remote prospect of future litigation” is not “in anticipation of litigation”
and is not work product); Garfinkle v. Arcata Nat’l Corp., 64 F.R.D. 688, 690 (S.D.N.Y.
1974) (holding that the remote possibility of litigation does not meet this requirement).
177. Binks Mfg. Co. v. Nat’l Presto Indus., 709 F.2d 1109, 1118 (7th Cir. 1983).
178. In re Sealed Case, 146 F.3d at 884 (“For a document to meet this standard, the
lawyer must at least have had a subjective belief that litigation was a real possibility, and that
belief must have been objectively reasonable.”); Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of
Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 865 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Amway, 2001 WL 1818698, at *6 (“[Work
product protection] is not applicable, however, unless some specific litigation is fairly
foreseeable at the time the work product is prepared.”); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, No.
M-11-189, 2001 WL 1167497, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2001) (“A document is prepared in
anticipation of litigation if there is the threat of some adversary proceeding, the document
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Moreover, given the litigious society in which we live and the reality that
businesses, like tobacco companies, insurance agencies, and banks, are
almost always contemplating or facing litigation, courts often interpret
these concepts very narrowly. 179
A good example of how courts have applied the concept narrowly is the
opinion in Binks Manufacturing Co. v. National Presto Industries, Inc. by
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit’s 180 In that case, Binks
sought payment for equipment it had sold to Presto after Presto refused to
pay because it claimed the equipment was faulty. 181 To determine if
litigation was reasonably “anticipated,” the court reviewed a series of
correspondence between the two companies. At first the letters were nonthreatening. The letters made clear that Binks wanted Presto to pay for the
equipment or, it claimed, Binks would “make arrangements to dismantle
and remove the equipment.” 182 Presto wanted Binks to fix the equipment
before it would pay. The correspondence culminated in a letter from Presto
to Binks, which stated that unless Binks fixed the equipment, Presto would
send a team to the plant to begin corrective work on the equipment, leading
to major associated costs. Further, Presto warned:
If you persist in your choice not to make the necessary corrections, we
shall have to proceed on our own and continue to hold you fully
responsible for any damages and expenses incurred. 183

Within two weeks of this letter, Presto sent an in-house attorney to the plant
to investigate and conduct interviews about the problems. 184 The attorney
summarized his findings, provided descriptions of some of the interviews,
and recommended a negotiation strategy in memoranda to Presto’s general
counsel. Additionally, he sent a memorandum to Presto’s Production
Manager that, among other things, depicted the general counsel’s opinion as
to the “allocation of responsibility between Presto and Binks for each of the
System’s respective breakdowns.” 185
Based on the correspondence between the two companies, however, the
court found that at the time these memoranda were written, there was
merely the remote possibility of litigation.186 Although it found that
was prepared because of that threat and the document was created after that threat became
real.”); Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 97 F.R.D. 749, 754 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (“The abstract
possibility that an event might be the subject of future litigation will not support a claim of
privilege . . . .”).
179. Patricia L. Andel, Inapplicability of the Self-Critical Analysis Privilege to the Drug
and Medical Device Industry, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 93, 102 (1997) (“[T]he requirement that
the information be compiled ‘in anticipation of litigation’ has been interpreted narrowly.”).
180. 709 F.2d 1109.
181. Binks Mfg. Co., 709 F.2d at 1112–13. Binks believed that the equipment was
“defectively manufactured,” while Presto believed Binks had not installed the system
properly. Id. at 1112.
182. Id. at 1119.
183. Id. at 1120.
184. Id. at 1113.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1120. The first memo written to the general counsel had been protected as
work product by the lower court and that decision was not appealed. Id. at 1120 n.8.
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Presto’s letters were “threatening,” it concluded that they “f[ell] short of
stating that Presto intended to institute litigation concerning the System.
Rather, the letters clearly state[d] that Presto still intended to persuade
Binks to correct the problems in the System and, falling short of that, to
withhold full payment of the purchase price of the System.” 187 Further, the
court emphasized that the letters indicated that Presto would send “experts”
[i.e., the in-house attorney] to fix the equipment and did not actually state
that the visit by the experts was to prepare for litigation.188 The court
reached its decision even though the letters from the general counsel made
clear that lawyers were involved and that litigation eventually did ensue.189
Thus, to meet this part of the work product doctrine, litigation needs to be
actually pending or “impending”—“about to happen” or “imminent” 190—
much like a marriage is “impending” after an engagement. And this is true
even if at the time the court is deciding whether work product protection
should apply, the actual litigation is already underway.
b. The “Primary Motivating Purpose” Test, the “Because of” Test, and the
Ordinary Course of Business Exception
Over time, two principle tests have emerged to define the non-temporal
aspect to the “in anticipation of litigation” requirement: the “because of”
test and the “primary motivating purpose” test. Currently, the thirteen
federal appellate courts are split over what test to use. The majority of them
apply the “because of” test.191 They protect documents if they “were
However, the court noted that it would have, had it been appealed, determined that this first
memo was also “not prepared in anticipation of litigation.” Id. Therefore, it disagreed with
Presto’s argument that it was a disconnect to decide that litigation was not “anticipated” at
the time of the later two memos since they were written after the protected one. Id.
187. Id. at 1120 (explaining that because there was only “the remote prospect of
litigation” and no “articulable claim, likely to lead to litigation,” when the memoranda were
prepared, the memoranda were like any other “investigative report developed in the ordinary
course of business”) (internal quotations omitted).
188. This naively assumes that companies always apprise the other side when it is
beginning to prepare its case in order file a cause of action. Id.
189. Id.
190. DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/impending (last visited
Mar. 23, 2011) (defining “impending” as, first and foremost, “about to happen; imminent:
their impending marriage” and secondarily as “imminently threatening or menacing: an
impending storm”). Although there is some support for the view that the work product must
be related to litigation that is pending or impending to be protected, many courts have
decided otherwise. See Rattner v. Netburn, No. 88 Civ. 2080 (GLG), 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
6876, at *17 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. June 20, 1989); United States v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 66
F.R.D. 154, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Honeywell, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 50 F.R.D. 117,
119 (M.D. Pa. 1970). Instead, courts “hold that the rule affords protection at least in
lawsuits that are related to the litigation for which the document was prepared.” Rattner,
1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6876, at *17 n.3 (citing multiple cases in support of the proposition);
id. (explaining that “some cases have indicated that the work-product rule may be invoked in
any litigation, whether or not related”).
191. The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth,
Ninth, and D.C. Circuits apply the “because of” standard. See, e.g., United States v.
Roxworthy, 457 F.3d 590, 593 (6th Cir. 2006) (“Today, we join our sister circuits and adopt
the ‘because of’ test as the standard for determining whether documents were prepared ‘in
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prepared ‘because of’ existing or expected litigation.” 192 If, on the one
hand, the document “would have been prepared irrespective of the expected
litigation,” then protection will not be provided.193 On the other hand, if
the anticipated litigation was in any way part of the impetus for creating the
work, then the work can be protected under the “because of” test.194
Other courts apply a higher standard and only protect material when the
“primary motivating purpose” behind the creation of the work was to assist
in pending or anticipated litigation.195 Thus, as the Second Circuit has
pointed out, the “primary motivating purpose” test “would potentially
exclude documents containing analysis of expected litigation, if their
primary, ultimate . . . purpose is to assist in making the business decision”
whereas the “because of” test enables protection for “such documents,
despite the fact that their purpose is not to ‘assist in’ litigation.” 196 The
anticipation of litigation.’”); United States v. Torf (In re Grand Jury Subpoena), 357 F.3d
900, 907 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[W]e join a growing number of our sister circuits in employing
the formulation of the ‘because of’ standard.”); Adlman II, 134 F.3d 1194, 1195, 1198 (2d
Cir. 1998); Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Murray Sheet Metal Co., 967 F.2d 980, 984 (4th Cir.
1992) (“The document must be prepared because of the prospect of litigation when the
preparer faces an actual claim or a potential claim following an actual event or series of
events that reasonably could result in litigation.”); Senate of P.R. v. U.S. Dept. of Justice,
823 F.2d 574, 586 n.42 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (explaining that whether an investigation is
underway is not dispositive but rather “whether, in light of the nature of the document and
the factual situation in the particular case, the document can fairly be said to have been
prepared or obtained because of the prospect of litigation” (internal citations and quotations
omitted)); Simon v. G.D. Searle & Co., 816 F.2d 397, 401 (8th Cir. 1987); Binks Mfg. Co.,
709 F.2d at 1118–20; In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 604 F.2d 798, 803 (3d Cir. 1979)
(“[T]he test should be whether in light of the nature of the document and the factual situation
in the particular case, the document can fairly be said to have been prepared or obtained
because of the prospect of litigation.” (internal citations and quotations omitted)).
The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have yet to
explicitly adopt or reject either of the tests. See Pease-Wingenter, supra note 2, at 145 n.144
(“[A]s of this writing, neither the Tenth nor the Federal Circuit has adopted either the
‘primary purpose’ or the ‘because of’ test.”). However, it appears that the Eleventh Circuit,
if forced to choose, would adopt the “because of” test. Regions Fin. Corp. v. United States,
No. 2:06-CV-00895-RDP, 2008 WL 2139008, at *5 (N.D. Ala. May 8, 2008) (stating that no
binding decision clearly adopted the “primary motivating purpose” test and predicting that, if
it had to decide on which standard the Eleventh Circuit would employ, it would likely be the
“because of litigation” test).
192. Adlman II, 134 F.3d at 1195, 1198; see also United States v. ChevronTexaco Corp.,
241 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1082 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (explaining that Rule 26(b)(3) does not “state
that a document must have been prepared to aid in the conduct of litigation in order to
constitute work product, much less primarily or exclusively to aid in litigation. Preparing a
document ‘in anticipation of litigation’ is sufficient.” (quoting Adlman II, 134 F.3d at 1198,
1202))).
193. Adlman II, 134 F.3d at 1195, 1204–05.
194. Id. at 1198.
195. United States v. Gulf Oil Corp., 760 F.2d 292, 296 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1985) (“If
the primary motivating purpose behind the creation of the document is not to assist in
pending or impending litigation, then a finding that the document enjoys work product
immunity is not mandated.”); see also Adlman II, 134 F.3d at 1197–98 (explaining that some
courts protect documents if they were “prepared because of expected litigation,” but that
others do so only if they were prepared “‘primarily or exclusively to assist in litigation,’”
which is a higher standard); United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 542–43 (Former 5th
Cir. 1982).
196. Adlman II, 134 F.3d at 1198 (emphasis added).
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“because of” test, therefore, is a very liberal test.197 That said, as will be
explicated below, some courts that claim to be applying the “because of”
test deny protection when the work in question does not actually help or aid
the anticipated litigation in some way. 198
The ordinary course of business exception was derived from the advisory
committee’s notes to FRCP 26. 199 Generally speaking, the work product
doctrine protects documents that were created for both litigation and
business purposes. 200 However, materials are not protected if they would
have been produced in the ordinary course of business in a substantially
similar form, 201 even if the party believes at the time the work is conducted
that the work would be helpful if litigation ensues.202 That said, when
materials that would have been created in the ordinary course of business
are made in a substantially different way, they are supposed to be protected.

197. See Pease-Wingenter, supra note 2, at 148 (indicating that the correct interpretation
of the “because of” test as outlined by Wright & Miller’s Federal Practice and Procedure,
does not require that the work be useful in anticipated litigation).
198. See, e.g., United States v. Textron Inc. & Subsidiaries, 577 F.3d 21, 30 (1st Cir.
2009) (claiming to apply the “because of” test, but instead applying a “prepared for use” in
litigation test); id. at 32–33 (Torruella, J., dissenting) (contending that the majority claims to
follow the “because of” test, but instead applies a different and more rigorous standard);
United States v. Textron Inc. & Subsidiaries, 507 F. Supp. 2d 138, 150–51 (D.R.I. 2007); see
also Pease-Wingenter, supra note 2, at 150; Douglas S. Stransky, United States v. Textron,
Inc.: The First Circuit En Banc Eviscerates the Work Product Doctrine and Creates a New
“Prepared For” Test, PRAC. U.S./DOMESTIC TAX STRATEGIES, July 2009, at 1, 3 (describing
Textron as placing a “severe restriction” on work product protection); infra note 270; infra
notes 341–351 and accompanying text (explaining the test applied by Textron).
199. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note, 48 F.R.D. 487, 499 (1970).
200. Textron, 577 F.3d at 41; NXIVM Corp. et al. v. O’Hara, 241 F.R.D. 109, 128
(N.D.N.Y. 2007) (“The crux being that a document which has been prepared because of the
prospect of litigation will not lose its protection under the work product doctrine, even
though it may assist in business decisions.”).
201. Adlman II, 134 F.3d at 1202 (“[T]he ‘because of’ formulation that we adopt here
withholds protection from documents that are prepared in the ordinary course of business or
that would have been created in essentially similar form irrespective of the litigation.”);
Linde Thomson Langworthy Kohn & Van Dyke v. Resolution Trust Corp., 5 F.3d 1508,
1515 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (“A litigant must demonstrate that documents were created ‘with a
specific claim supported by concrete facts which would likely lead to litigation in mind’ . . .
not merely assembled in the ordinary course of business or for other nonlitigation purposes.”
(quoting Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 865 (D.C. Cir. 1980)));
In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1657-L, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23164, at *9 (E.D.
La. Mar. 5, 2007) (“[T]he work-product doctrine ‘does not protect materials assembled in the
ordinary course of business, pursuant to regulatory requirements, or for other non-litigation
purposes.’” (quoting Carroll v. Praxair, Inc., No. 05-0307, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43991, at
*2 (W.D. La. June 28, 2006))).
202. Redvanly v. NYNEX Corp., 152 F.R.D. 460, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); see also U.S. v.
Roxworthy, 457 F.3d 590, 598–99 (6th Cir. 2006) (“[D]ocuments do not lose their work
product privilege ‘merely because [they were] created in order to assist with a business
decision,’ unless the documents ‘would have been created in essentially similar form
irrespective of the litigation.’” (quoting Adlman II, 134 F.3d at 1202)); Adlman II, 134 F.3d
at 1195 (“Where a document was created because of anticipated litigation, and would not
have been prepared in substantially similar form but for the prospect of that litigation, it falls
within Rule 26(b)(3).”).
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Arguably, this is because the differences expose counsel’s thought
processes to adversaries. 203
It appears from the case law that courts handle this exception in two
ways. Some courts interpret the exception to be an overarching rule to
which one of the two motivating factor tests is applied. Essentially, when
courts interpret the exception this way, they attempt to determine whether
the work was routine by focusing on the motivation behind the work. 204
For example, in Soeder v. General Dynamics Corp., 205 after a plane crash,
the aircraft manufacturer conducted an investigation and developed an “‘InHouse’ Accident Report.” 206 The court found that the report was developed
in the ordinary course of business and not because of the potential
litigation:
Certainly litigation is a contingency to be recognized by any aircraft
accident. However, given the equally reasonable desire of Defendant to
improve its aircraft products, to protect future pilots and passengers of its
aircraft, to guard against adverse publicity in connection with such aircraft
crashes, and to promote its own economic interests by improving its
prospect for future contracts for the production of said aircraft, it can
hardly be said that Defendant’s “in-house” [accident] report is not
prepared in the ordinary course of business. 207

As one court explained, this exception is “a necessary corollary, when it is
clear that documents ‘would have been prepared independent of any
anticipation of use in litigation (i.e., because some other purpose or
obligation was sufficient to cause them to be prepared), no work product
can attach.’” 208 Unsurprisingly, if one side asserts that documents were
203. Based on this same reasoning, there is “a ‘narrow exception’ to the general rule that
third-party documents in the possession of an attorney do not merit work product
protection.” In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated March 19, 2002 & August 2, 2002, 318 F.3d
379, 386 (2d Cir. 2003). When the party asserting work product protection can “show ‘a
real, rather than speculative, concern’ that counsel’s thought processes ‘in relation to
pending or anticipated litigation’ will be exposed through disclosure of the” compilation of
third party documents by counsel, then they can be protected. Id.
204. MSF Holding Ltd. v. Fiduciary Trust Co. Int’l, No. 03 CIV 1818PKLJCF, 2005 WL
3046287, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 2005) (explaining that the “the [‘because of’] rule is
intended to distinguish material that is truly attorney work product from that which would be
created in the normal course of business”).
205. 90 F.R.D. 253 (D. Nev. 1980).
206. Id. at 254.
207. Id. at 255; see also ADT Sec. Serv., Inc. v. Swenson, No. 07-2983 (JRT/AJB), 2010
WL 2954545, at *3 (D. Minn. July 26, 2010); Testwuide v. United States, No. 01-201L,
2006 WL 5625760, at *7 (Fed. Cl. Aug. 7, 2006) (“Because some of the documents involved
in this dispute were apparently produced both for the purpose of litigation and to comply
with NEPA, the Court had to determine whether the documents ‘would have been created in
essentially similar form irrespective of the litigation’ for ‘[i]t is well established that work
product privilege does not apply to such documents.’” (quoting Adlman II, 134 F.3d at
1202)).
208. Amway Corp. v. Proctor & Gamble Co., No. 1:98-CV-726, 2001 WL 1818698, at *6
(W.D. Mich. Apr. 3, 2001) (quoting First Pac. Networks, Inc. v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Co., 163
F.R.D. 574, 582 (N.D. Cal. 1995)); see also 8 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 162, at § 2024
(explaining that the test should be the “because of” test, “[b]ut that the converse of this is
that even though litigation is already in prospect, there is no work product immunity for
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prepared “because of” or primarily for litigation, the other side counters that
the documents were prepared in the ordinary course of business.209
Additionally, the because of test is sometimes described in the context of
the “ordinary course of business” exception.210
Alternatively, other courts consider the exception to be a test in its own
right that essentially trumps the need to apply either of the motivating factor
tests. For example, in Hardy v. New York News, Inc., 211 to determine
whether a group of documents were prepared in the ordinary course of
business, the court considered whether the work was similar to the work of
that person’s “general” and “continued” function at the company and
emphasized that some work was required “annually” and was part of the
company’s “long range management policy.” 212
c. Materials Prepared by the Attorney Versus Materials Prepared By
Others
It is fairly clear that the work product doctrine protects materials by nonlawyers. While the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers states that
work product protection applies to materials prepared by a lawyer, 213 it
acknowledges that “[f]ederal and state discovery rules accord work-product
protection to others, including personnel who assist a lawyer, and to
litigation preparation of a party and the party’s representatives.”214 FRCP
26(b) supports this interpretation and indeed, does not specify that a lawyer
has to be involved with the preparation of the materials at all.215 In fact, the
Rule does not even call the protection the “attorney work product doctrine”
and makes reference to a variety of non-lawyers who might produce
protected materials including the other party, consultants, and agents of the
attorney. 216 Instead, the focus of the rule seems to be on whether the work
was done in anticipation of litigation by the person preparing the work.217
documents prepared in the regular course of business rather than for purposes of the
litigation.”).
209. See, e.g., United States v. Textron, 507 F. Supp. 2d 138, 150 (D.R.I. 2007).
210. See, e.g., Adlman II, 134 F.3d at 1205 (“In short, the enforceability of the IRS
summons for the Memorandum will turn on whether it (or substantially the same document)
would have been prepared irrespective of the anticipated litigation and therefore was not
prepared because of it.”).
211. 114 F.R.D. 633 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
212. Id. at 645–46 (claiming that “the fact that documents prepared for a business purpose
were also determined to be of potential use in pending litigation does not turn these
documents into workproduct [sic]”); see also SEC v. Thrasher, No. 92 Civ. 6987 (JFK),
1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1355, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 1995).
213. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 87 cmt. a (2000) (“This
Section defines the work-product immunity as it applies to lawyers.”).
214. Id.
215. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3) states that the work product doctrine
protects “the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of [the] attorney or
other representative concerning the litigation.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(B) (emphasis
added).
216. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(A) (emphasis added) (defining “another party or its
representative” as “including the other party’s attorney, consultant, . . . or agent”).
217. 1970 COMMENTS TO FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 26, supra note 123.
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As one scholar pointed out over twenty-five years ago, “The rule effectively
abolishes the need to determine the preparer’s status and replaces it with a
different form of analysis: whether or not the materials were prepared in
anticipation of litigation.”218
However, the case law demonstrates that disagreement persists as to
whether work product protection covers materials prepared by non-lawyers
working independently without lawyer involvement. 219 The Supreme
Court has stated that work product protection applies to materials created by
agents and consultants working “for” the lawyer. 220 Therefore, some courts
deny protection to work created by non-lawyers who acted
independently. 221 For those courts, it is not sufficient that the non-lawyer
was an agent working generally under the guidance and direction of the
attorney. 222 Instead, the actual work must be conducted under the direction
and control of a lawyer to be protected.223 This line of cases may be related
to those preceding the adoption of FRCP 26 in 1970 that confined
protection to work that “represent[s] the product of the training, skill or
knowledge of an attorney, which the work product privilege is aimed at
protecting.” 224

218. Anderson et al., supra note 99, at 869.
219. Id. at 866–70 (reporting similar disagreement in 1983 and citing cases in support).
220. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238–39 (1975) (justifying this extension of
the doctrine because “attorneys often must rely on the assistance of investigators and other
agents in the compilation of materials in preparation for trial. It is therefore necessary that
the [work product] doctrine protect material prepared by agents for the attorney as well as
those prepared by the attorney himself.”); see also In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 343 F.3d
658, 662 (3d Cir. 2003) (“[T]his protection extends beyond materials prepared by an
attorney to include materials prepared by an attorney’s agents and consultants.”); United
States v. Cabra, 622 F.2d 182, 185 (5th Cir. 1980) (providing work product protection to
notes taken by a paralegal at trial).
221. One court claimed that,
[A]ny report or statement made by or to a party’s agent (other than to an attorney
acting in the role of counselor), which has not been requested by nor prepared for
an attorney nor which otherwise reflects the employment of an attorney’s legal
expertise must be conclusively presumed to have been made in the ordinary course
of business . . . .
Thomas Organ Co. v. Jadranska Slobodna Plovidba, 54 F.R.D. 367, 372 (N.D. Ill. 1972); see
also In re Public Defender Serv., 831 A.2d 890, 911 (D.C. 2003) (holding that where
criminal defendant’s associates obtained written confession from witness at knife point, and
defendant gave attorney the confession, it was not protected work product because it was not
prepared by attorney or his agents).
222. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, No. M-11-189, 2001 WL 1167497, at *19 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 3, 2001) (holding that work conducted by an investigator was protected by the work
product doctrine when conducted under the direction and control of a party’s counsel but not
when the same investigator acted independently).
223. Id.; see also Plew v. Ltd. Brands, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 3741 (LTS) (MHD), 2009 WL
1119414 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 2009) (holding that work product applied to emails exchanged
in anticipation of litigation, between the defendant to a patent infringement suit and the
defendant’s non-party supplier because defendant sent the emails requesting the information
at the direction of the attorney).
224. Burke v. United States, 32 F.R.D. 213, 214 (E.D.N.Y. 1963). For a description of
the three lines of cases preceding adoption of the rule, see Anderson et al, supra note 99, at
865–66.
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Other courts, however, do not require a lawyer’s supervision for the work
product of a non-lawyer to be protected. In these jurisdictions, work
product protection applies to work created completely independently by
non-lawyers. 225 The rationale, similar to that expressed in the committee
notes to FRCP 26, is that “whether a document is protected depends on the
motivation behind its preparation, rather than on the person who prepares
it.” 226
III. THE WORK PRODUCT DOCTRINE AS APPLIED TO WORK RELATED TO
PUBLIC RELATIONS
As discussed in Part I, the role of the corporate attorney has changed
dramatically in the past twenty years.
Globalization, changes in
technology, the rise of in-house counsel, along with changing needs of
clients have blurred the professional lines of expertise. Moreover, the
changes have exacerbated the difficulty in determining whether and in what
circumstances work product protection should be applied to areas that
straddle the business/law divide.
The following section analyzes cases that assess whether the work
product doctrine protects communications or materials prepared in
conjunction with PR professionals. The PR context was chosen deliberately
because it reflects the blurring of expertise and the effect that changes in
technology, communication, and clients’ needs has had on the role of the
corporate attorney and the definition of litigation preparation. Attorneys
today manage legal PR around corporate legal controversies, and there is
disagreement about whether and how attorneys should be providing legal
PR service for their corporate clients.227 Moreover, in this context, the line
between business and law is extremely fuzzy. It is excruciatingly difficult
to discern when materials are being created for business purposes as
opposed to in anticipation of litigation or for trial. While many will never
be convinced that work related to PR should be protected by the work
225. See, e.g., Caremark, Inc. v. Affiliated Computer Servs., Inc., 195 F.R.D. 610, 615
(N.D. Ill. 2000) (“[M]aterials prepared in anticipation of litigation by any representative of
the client are protected, regardless of whether the representative is acting for the lawyer.”);
Moore v. Tri-City Hosp. Auth., 118 F.R.D. 646 (N.D. Ga. 1988) (holding that entries in
plaintiff’s diary discussing persons who could serve as witnesses in his lawsuit and attorneys
who could help him were work-product even though they were made a month and a half
before the plaintiff retained counsel).
Note, the case history of Moore v. Tri-City Hospital Authority is tumultuous. At the time
Moore was decided, the Fifth Circuit required a substantial probability of litigation, which is
a higher standard than currently applied in the Fifth Circuit. The case that impliedly
overrules Moore is Abdallah v. Coca-Cola Co., No. CIV A1:98CV3679RWS, 2000 WL
33249254 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 25, 2000), which adopts the looser “because of” standard,
specifically espousing the view of United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1981),
from the Fifth Circuit. Abdallah, 2000 WL 33249254, at *4, 8. In a related footnote,
Abdallah claims that Davis remains binding on the Eleventh Circuit. Id. at *4 n.1. Thus, as a
substantive matter, Moore likely would have been decided in the same vein today.
226. Caremark, Inc., 195 F.R.D. at 615; see also United States v. Chatham City Corp., 72
F.R.D. 640, 642 (S.D. Ga. 1976) (“[I]f statements of witnesses are to be protected from
discovery at all, the protection should not depend on who obtained the statement.”).
227. See generally Beardslee, supra note 15; Beardslee, supra note 45.
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product doctrine or that it has anything to do with the proper provision of
“legal” services or litigation, this Article and specifically, this section, does
not try to convince the non-believers. Instead, it seeks only to demonstrate
that in the PR context, when applying any of the work product doctrine
tests, judges: (1) attempt to make a distinction between business and law
that is difficult, if not impossible, to make, and (2) infuse the work product
doctrine’s tests with their own (oftentimes narrow) definition of litigation
preparation and what the corporate lawyer’s role should be. There is
evidence that similar maneuvers are made in other contexts,228 and if this is
true, then these findings have important implications for the future of
corporate legal services.
A. The “Primary Motivating Factor” Test
Because the “primary motivating factor” test requires courts to determine
whether materials were prepared primarily for use in litigation, courts are
forced to make a distinction between business and legal work. Yet, as the
cases addressing legal PR show, this distinction is often unworkable. For
example, when faced with high profile litigation, an attorney might ask a
PR consultant to provide a written analysis about how a certain trial
strategy (like denial, or counterclaiming) might be perceived by the public.
Although most courts would agree that this work is not done in the ordinary
course of business, determining the primary motivation of that work may be
impossible. By helping the attorney understand the chances for success,
this work might help the attorney determine the best trial strategy—a strong
legal motivation.229 However, this work has business implications as
228. Obviously, one fact pattern or context should not drive the law. Similar discernment
issues arise, for example, in the context of failed mergers and the use of financial
consultants. See, e.g., Hexion Specialty Chems., Inc., v. Huntsman Corp., C.A. No. 3841VCL, 2008 WL 3878339, at *4 (Del. Ch. Aug. 22, 2008) (struggling to determine whether
meetings with financial consultants were to help in the defense or structure of the pending
litigation or merely to provide financial advising with respect to the failed merger). Such
problems also arise in the context of internal investigations. As in a recent case surrounding
Merck and Vioxx, on the one hand, the motivation behind an investigation into corporate
wrongdoing and publication of a report of the findings that either absolve or criticize
corporate managers’ behavior could be said to be “primarily intended to influence public
opinion and to create positive publicity for Merck.” In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL
No. 1657-L, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23164, at *6–7 (E.D. La. Mar. 5, 2007). On the other
hand, it could be argued, as Merck did, that the lawyer investigator “was retained to prepare
a report in response to shareholder demands and the prospect of both litigation and
governmental investigation.” Id. As some courts recognize, “[a]pplying a distinction
between “anticipation of litigation” and “business purposes”” is blurry, “artificial,” and
“unrealistic.” In re Woolworth Corp. Sec. Class Action Litig., No. 94 CIV. 2217 (RO), 1996
WL 306576, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 1996). Moreover, courts addressing the application of
the work product doctrine in other contexts make similar moves to those highlighted in this
section. See infra notes 244, 279 and accompanying text.
229. United States v. Frederick, 182 F.3d 496, 500 (7th Cir. 1999) (“The work-product
privilege is intended to prevent a litigant from taking a free ride on the research and thinking
of his opponent’s lawyer and to avoid the resulting deterrent to a lawyer’s committing his
thoughts to paper.”); United States v. Textron Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 138, 152 (D.R.I. 2007)
(noting that “the purpose of the work product privilege is to prevent a potential adversary
from gaining an unfair advantage over a party by obtaining documents prepared . . . in
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well—it might help the corporation determine how a certain trial strategy or
litigation tactic might impact its bottom line.
Consider a real case, Rattner v. Netburn. 230 There, litigation between the
two parties had been ongoing for seven years. 231 Upon hearing that the
plaintiff was going to publish a letter publicly damning the defendants, the
defendants met with their attorneys and requested advice. 232 The attorneys
drafted a proposed public announcement and delivered it to the client with
the expectation of confidentiality. 233 The attorneys likely believed that an
announcement crafted by the PR people could, if not worded appropriately,
misrepresent the facts, the truth or the law and worse, prevent the future use
of certain defenses. 234 But the Court found that neither the attorney-client
privilege nor the work product doctrine protected the draft press release
from disclosure. 235 In analyzing whether the work product doctrine
applied, the court identified both a legal and business purpose to the
attorney-drafted press release. It admitted that the press release might help
the proponents to continue to litigate their case and that, without the
properly crafted response, the defendants would be forced to settle.236
Nevertheless, the court ultimately decided that the draft press release was
designed primarily for a business purpose, “to shore up the [defendants’]
political position with their constituents,” as opposed to a legal purpose.237
The “primary motivating factor” test is similar to the test used to
determine whether the attorney-client privilege applies,238 but there are
important differences in purpose and function between the two doctrines
and their tests. Specifically, to garner work product protection, the work
performed in anticipation of litigation does not have to be primarily for
anticipation of litigation which may reveal the party’s strategy or the party’s own assessment
of the strengths and weaknesses of its case”).
230. No. 88 Civ. 2080 (GLG), 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6876 (S.D.N.Y. June 20, 1989).
This case was decided before the Second Circuit had definitively adopted the “because of”
test. See supra note 191 (listing cases applying the “because of” standard and explaining the
test).
231. Rattner v. Netburn, No. 88 Civ. 2080 (GLG), 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6876, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. June 20, 1989).
232. Id. at *7.
233. Id. at *11.
234. For example, if the press release was viewed as an apology, it might forestall the use
of a denial in the future. An apology or expression of sympathy has been used, in other
contexts, as proof of liability. See, e.g., Sarah Kellogg, The Art and Power of the Apology,
WASH. L., June 2007, at 21, 25 (noting that twenty-nine states have passed laws excluding
expression of sympathy as proof of liability in medical malpractice suits andﬁve states have
passed laws that require hospitals to notify patients of adverse medical outcomes).
235. Rattner, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6876, at *14–17 (deciding that the attorney-client
privilege did not apply); id. at *18 (finding that defendants did not meet their burden of
showing that the primary motivating purpose was to assist in the “pending or impending
litigation” (quoting United States v. Gulf Oil Corp., 760 F.2d 292, 296 (Temp. Emer. Ct.
App. 1985))).
236. Id. at *18 (“[A]lthough this is surely an understandable goal, and indeed one that
might make it easier for the Village to continue to spend large sums on its lawsuits, it cannot
be said that the document was for use in litigation.”).
237. Id.
238. Id. at *15 (explaining that if the communication “is [not] designed to meet problems
which can fairly be characterized as predominately legal, the privilege does not apply”).
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legal advice. Instead, work motivated primarily by the desire to help the
lawyer in anticipation of litigation will be protected. Arguably, the press
release in Rattner could have been specially crafted by lawyers to ensure
that what was communicated to the press was synergistic with the litigation
strategy (and what would be communicated at trial). Alternatively, it could
have been crafted to combat negative publicity that already existed and
might have affected potential juries or judges.239 Both moves are allowed
under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Thus, it is incongruent
that the court did not even entertain that the work product doctrine would
apply.
Further, to distinguish between business and law, the court appeared to
infuse into the analysis its own definition of corporate practice, the role of a
corporate attorney, and litigation. Despite identifying a possible legal
purpose to the press release, in the same breath the court claimed that the
press release was simply not useful at all in litigation. 240 The court
explained that drafting a press release was something that a publicist—as
opposed to an attorney—would do. 241 This is consistent with the court’s
reasoning for denying attorney-client privilege protection. The court
reasoned that it is not “ordinarily a part of the attorney’s legal advice
function to prepare public announcements for the client, although he may
well be called upon to review proposed announcements for legal
implications.” 242 While the “primary motivating” test, if applied as
intended, might very well have logically prevented work product protection,
based on these facts (presuming the primary motivating factor could be
indentified), it seems the court did not even determine which motivation
was the primary one. Instead, it summarily decided that legal PR was not
useful—ever—in litigation, and therefore, it was unnecessary to determine
whether business or legal purposes were the primary motivation behind the
work. Thus, even if the court has been applying the “because of” test, it
may still have denied protection. And as will be shown in the next section,
when courts apply the “because of” test along with a narrow view of what
corporate practice and litigation encompasses, they can (and do) deny
protection.
B. The “Because of” Test
The “because of” test, on its face, seems to solve the problems inherent in
the “primary motivating factor” test. It appears to avoid the task of
239. Beardslee, supra note 15, at 1274–75 (explaining that neither judges nor juries are
immune).
240. See supra note 236.
241. Rattner, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6876, at *18–19 (“The fact that the draft was
authored by an attorney does not change this result. The work product rule ‘does not extend
to every written document generated by an attorney; it does not shield from disclosure
everything that a lawyer does.’ If counsel chose in this case to perform a publicist’s
function, the documents prepared in that connection cannot be shielded by the work product
rule.” (citation omitted) (quoting Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 617 F.2d 854,
864 (D.C. Cir. 1980))).
242. Id. at *15.
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separating business from legal work because work is protected if the
proponent can merely show that it was prepared “because of” anticipated
litigation. 243 Despite this, even when courts claim to be applying the
“because of test,” courts can and do delve into the opaque task of making a
distinction between business and law—and when they do, it affects the
outcome. 244 For example, in ADT Security Services, Inc. v. Swenson,245 in
the course of analyzing whether the attorney-client privilege and work
product doctrine applied to communications concerning press around the
case, some of which was authored by the client’s attorneys, the magistrate
judge began by defining business and legal functions. The court stated that
“[a]dvertising, responding to media inquiries, and engaging in other public
relations efforts are traditional business functions.” 246 Perhaps due to this
belief, in analyzing whether certain documents could be protected, the court
lumped together thirteen different documents that involved PR in some way
and labeled them all “communications concerning media coverage of [the
client].” 247 However, some of the documents were emails between the
client, and inside and outside counsel discussing the possible media
response to the litigation and providing legal advice about what could and
could not be said. 248 Other documents were draft press releases written by
the general counsel that varied in scope and content from the press release
that was actually published. 249 Further, the court did not conduct separate
analyses of the attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine 250
despite the fact that their contours are very different. 251 Importantly, the
attorney-client privilege, unlike the work product doctrine, requires that a
court attempt to demarcate legal from business advice since it only applies
to communications made primarily for the provision of legal advice.252
243. See supra notes 192–93 and accompanying text.
244. This is true in other contexts as well. For example, in a case involving a failed
merger, a court applying the “because of test” denied work product protection because the
presentations and materials of the financial consultants “consist[ed] of business, not legal,
advice.” Hexion Specialty Chems., Inc., v. Huntsman Corp., C.A. No.3841-VCL, 2008 WL
3878339, at *4 (Del. Ch. Aug. 22, 2008). The court acknowledged that “some of those
presentations address[ed] questions raised by the outbreak of litigation” but because some of
“the advice relate[d] to business issues rather than to the conduct or defense of litigation,”
work product protection was unavailable. Id. Thus, it viewed the financial consultants as
acting as “financial advisor[s]” as opposed to litigation consultants. Essentially, it appears to
have applied a primary purpose test despite announcing that it was applying the “because of”
test. Id. Moreover, it clearly attempted to draw a line between business and law.
245. No. 07-2983 (JRT/AJB), 2010 WL 276234 (D. Minn. Jan. 15, 2010), rev’d by ADT
Sec. Serv., Inc. v. Swenson, No. 07-2983 (JRT/AJB), 2010 WL 2954545, at *4–5 (D. Minn.
July 26, 2010). Note, the Eighth Circuit applies the “because of” test.
246. Id. at *3 (making this point in its analysis of the talking points but referring to it later
in its analysis of the communications around the media).
247. Id. at *4.
248. Id. at *3.
249. Id. at *4–5.
250. Beardslee, supra note 44, at 755 n.146 (pointing out that courts sometimes mix the
two analyses and use one test to determine the other). See also infra note 267 and
accompanying text.
251. See supra Part II.B.1.b.
252. See supra Part II.B.1.b.
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Perhaps, in part, because the analyses of the two doctrines was merged
together, the ADT court found that neither the attorney-client privilege nor
the work product doctrine applied because “the entire tenor of the
documents [was] to craft a response for a news report concerning [the
client].” 253 Finally, the court explained that “[w]here the legal team is the
author of the documents [related to PR], they are acting in a public relations
capacity.” 254 Evidently, the judge believed that a line could easily be
drawn between law and business and had a narrow view of the role of a
corporate attorney and that which PR can and should play in litigation
strategy. To this judge, communications involving PR could only be
“prepared in anticipation of a potential media battle, instead of a courtroom
battle.” 255
On appeal, Judge John R. Tunheim of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Minnesota did not adopt as narrow a view as the magistrate
judge of the lawyer’s role in managing PR around legal controversies or the
role that PR can play in legal controversies and litigation. Judge Tunheim
overturned most of the magistrate judge’s holdings with respect to the
attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine and handled the
analysis much differently. He began by separating the documents identified
by the magistrate judge as communications concerning media coverage into
four distinct categories. 256 He then analyzed each category to determine if
either the attorney-client doctrine or the work product doctrine should
apply. He denied protection to press releases and newspaper clippings
already in the public domain but provided work product protection to
previous drafts of press release because they included the mental
impressions of the attorneys. 257 Although this analysis appears correct, to
justify this treatment, he stated that “[t]he Court has examined the
substantive differences between the drafts and concludes that counsel was
acting primarily in a legal capacity, rather than simply in a public relations
or business capacity, in making revisions to the document.” 258 Arguably,
this statement implies that the court mistakenly believed that the lawyer had
to be acting in a “legal” capacity to garner work product protection, while in
reality the work product doctrine historically extended to work created by
non-lawyers who presumably can never act in a “legal capacity.” 259 Taken
together, these two opinions suggest that if a court has a narrow view of a
corporate lawyer’s job and of how litigation can/should be managed outside
and inside the courtroom, the very broad and seemingly easy-to-pass

253. ADT, 2010 WL 276234, at *4.
254. Id.
255. Id. at *3 (citing Teena-Ann V. Sankoorikal & Kathleen H. McDermott, AttorneyClient Privilege and Work-Product Doctrine: Potential Pitfalls of Disclosure to Public
Relations Firms, 786 PRACTICING L. INST. 271, 286 (2008)).
256. ADT Sec. Serv., Inc. v. Swenson, No. 07-2983 (JRT/AJB), 2010 WL 2954545, at
*4–5 (D. Minn. July 26, 2010).
257. ADT, 2010 WL 2954545, at *4.
258. Id. at *5.
259. See supra Part II.B.2.c.
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“because of” standard is as insurmountable as the more exacting “primary
purpose” test.
Further support of this conclusion is that some courts, purportedly
applying the “because of” test, infuse the test with a primary motivation
analysis. In NXIVM Corp. v. O’Hara, 260 the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of New York declared that sharing a report about an
internal investigation with an external PR agency waived work product
protection. 261 The court recognized that work product protection applied to
a party’s representative and that “the exchange of such documents and ideas
with those whose expertise and knowledge of certain facts can help the
attorney in the assessment of any aspect of the litigation does not invoke a
waiver of the doctrine.” 262 Indeed, it considered it “[o]bvious[]” that
“impressions and strategies” are created by talking with others. 263 The
court found that the PR firm “reviewed legal documents, pleadings, judicial
decisions and the like, and participated in strategy discussions about [the
opposing party] and the litigation” 264 and admitted that:
Even the most proficient and prolific attorneys have to resort to
consultation with others in order to render full and complete legal services
to their clients. That is how the legal world now turns. As a harbinger of
things to come, such as media firms assisting attorneys in mega-litigation
cases with economic, political, and social ramifications for their
clients . . . . 265

Yet based in part on its attorney-client privilege analysis, the court found
work product protection waived because the PR agency was hired
“primarily to combat negative press and create a long term and short term
public relations strategy and hopefully generate positive press.” 266
In addition to imparting a primary purpose examination to the “because
of” test, the court also openly infused its work product analysis with its
findings on whether the attorney-client privilege was applicable.267 This is
260. 241 F.R.D. 109 (N.D.N.Y. 2007).
261. See id. at 142.
262. Id. at 128.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 140.
265. Id. at 140–41.
266. Id. at 140 (emphasis added) (“[B]ut the predominate services [the PR firm] furnished
were monitoring relevant news coverage, collecting information on [the opposing party] and
others, vetting and pitching news stories to reporters, researching and locating friendly
reporters, capitalizing on positive developments, creating a press kit, and otherwise
formulating a public relation strategy.” (emphasis added)). Other courts have found the
opposite, that is, that work product protection applies to notes detailing meetings wherein
attorneys communicate legal strategy to “the representative of the public relations firm so
that the public relations firm could properly represent [the client] with regard to th[e]
action.” Fitzgerald v. Cantor, No. 16297-NC, 1999 WL 135237, at *1 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15,
1999).
267. This court admitted that it was using its reasoning behind its decision to deny
attorney-client privilege protection to determine whether work product protection should
apply. NXIVM Corp., 241 F.R.D. at 141 (admitting that “[f]or several critical reasons, which
we alluded to [in the analysis] above [involving the attorney client privilege], we are also not
prepared to apply to our case the Calvin Klein Trademark determination that work product
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problematic because it leads a court to look at the primary motivation and
attempt to distinguish law from business—which, as discussed above, are
complicated, if not impossible, tasks. Further, in so doing, courts forget the
two doctrines’ very different stances towards work created by or with nonlawyer third parties. This is exactly what happened here.
Here, in denying attorney-client privilege protection, the NXIVM court
defensibly believed that the communication was not primarily to attain legal
advice. 268 In support of its decision, the NXIVM court emphasized that the
PR agency did not receive the report from the attorneys, nor was there
evidence that the attorneys met and discussed the report with the PR
agency. 269 However, as the court stated, work created by a party or a
representative can be protected as work product if it was prepared “because
of” the litigation. Despite this, the court applied a more stringent test than
the “because of” litigation test—something akin to the “primary purpose”
analysis. 270 As mentioned above, the court admitted that the PR firm
helped with the litigation strategy, yet ultimately concluded that “[the PR
agency] was hired to clean up NXIVM’s damaged image . . . . The
underlying and transparent intent was to use the contents of the Interfor
Report to promulgate certain images of both Ross and NXIVM or deflect
further media intrusion by Ross and others.” 271
Other court decisions, such as Haugh v. Schroder Investment
Management North America, Inc., 272 have found similar uses of PR firms
during litigation to meet the “because of” test. Despite recognizing this
fact, the NXIVM court determined that work product protection was waived
because disclosing the report was “a deliberate, affirmative and selective
strategic decision to disclose this information for another benefit other than
protection is not waived when ‘the attorney provides the work product to the public relations
consultant whom he has hired and who maintains the attorney’s work product in
confidence . . . [especially] if . . . the public relations firm needs to know the attorney’s
strategy in order to advise as to the public relations[.]’” (alteration in original) (quoting
Calvin Klein Trademark Trust v. Wachner, 198 F.R.D. 53, 55 (S.D.N.Y. 2000))); see supra
note 250.
268. NXIVM Corp., 241 F.R.D. at 140 (“O’Hara’s involvement was nothing more than a
tool to achieve secrecy, not to give legal advice.”). Also, the court applied a narrow test to
determine whether attorney-client privilege was waived by sharing the report with the third
party. See id. at 141 (“Notwithstanding the cogent reasoning that incorporates modern
realities and intentions in addressing how profile cases are handled in the courtroom and the
court of public opinion, we are not prepared to make that same deviation from the narrowly
tailored test of Kovel and Ackert.”). Granted, there were credibility issues on both sides.
Indeed, the court prefaced the opinion by bemoaning the convoluted, complicated nature of
the case in addition to the issues of credibility. Id. at 114 & n.5; see also id. at 142
(contending that the PR firm’s “relationship with O’Hara was nothing short of smoke and
mirrors”).
269. See id. at 142.
270. Courts within districts that apply the “because of” test also sometimes overlay a
“primary purpose” or “exclusively for litigation” lens to the ordinary course of business
exception. See, e.g., de Espana v. Am. Bureau of Shipping, No. 03 Civ. 3573 LTSRLE, 2005
WL 3455782, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 2005).
271. NXIVM Corp., 241 F.R.D. at 142 (emphasis added).
272. No. 02 CIV. 7955 (DLC), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14586 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2003);
see infra notes 324–29 and accompanying text.
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aiding the lawyer pitched in the battle of litigation. The benefit was for
control of the airwaves and print media, which NXIVM hoped to profit.”273
On the one hand, this may be true—and some might contend the work
product doctrine should not, therefore, protect this communication under
any test. On the other hand, as other courts have argued, positively
influencing the court of public opinion might be a strategic decision to help
in the current litigation (and possible future litigation) by creating good will
among regulators, 274 court personnel, and potential jurors or by pressuring
the other side to settle. 275
Whether or not the consultation with the PR agency was actually
intended to aid the attorney in assessing the strength and weaknesses of the
case or develop case strategies or theories in litigation (and therefore could
justifiably be protected as work product), it is clear that this judge was not
applying the “because of” test. Rather, the court applied some stricter
standard that included the judge’s view of what the role of the lawyer
should be, the breadth of litigation, and what constitutes legal—as opposed
to business—advice. Here, the court did not claim that the work product
doctrine did not apply, but instead that it was waived. Work product
protection, however, is supposedly only waived when it enables an
adversary to access confidential information.276 This is because the work
product was designed to enable attorneys to seek the help and expertise of
others in order to analyze the strength and weaknesses of their clients’ case
and develop case strategies and theories.277 As a result, the holding
regarding the waiver suggests that the court departed from a traditional
“because of” test.
C. The Ordinary Course of Business Exception
As mentioned above, the ordinary course of business exception is
sometimes utilized as a direct corollary to the “because of” test. The
NXIVM court reasoned that if the work would have been produced in the
ordinary course of business, then it could not have been produced “because
of” the anticipated litigation.278 In the PR context, however, courts
sometimes make two moves that are inconsistent with the contours of the
doctrine. First, some courts infuse the “ordinary course of business”
analysis with a “primary purpose” component, even if the court sits in a
jurisdiction that has adopted the “because of” test. Second, courts
occasionally deny protection because the work would have been done in the
ordinary course of business without considering whether the work would
273. NXIVM Corp., 241 F.R.D. at 142.
274. Here, there were alleged illegalities on the part of NXVIM and its strategic partner,
Intefor, which O’Hara had disclosed to the public. This may have motivated regulators to
bring charges against NXVIM. See, e.g., Beardslee, supra note 15, at 1270 (contending that
regulators often get leads from the press and pursue a certain target to appease the public).
275. For a detailed discussion of how the court of public opinion can impact the process
and outcome of litigation, see generally Beardslee, supra note 15.
276. See supra notes 162–164 and accompanying text.
277. See supra notes 162–164 and accompanying text.
278. See supra Part II.B.2.b.
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have been done in the same or substantially similar way if the anticipation
of litigation did not exist. 279 Such action contravenes the formal
requirements of the exception. Although the ordinary business exception
only excludes material when it would have been produced in the same or
similar form, courts instead apply the exception like an “ordinary business
ingredient” test. 280 Additionally, in attempting to determine whether
something was created in the ordinary course of business, courts inevitably
seek to distinguish between business and law. Of course, the same issues
arise as those described above, and if a judge has a narrow view of
contemporary corporate law practice, they are likely to deny protection.
A good example of these maneuvers can be found in de Espana v.
American Bureau of Shipping, 281 decided by the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York, a jurisdiction that has adopted the “because
of” text. In de Espana, the nation of Spain brought suit against a shipping
company over a ship that sunk off the country’s shores. The defendant
shipping company accidentally produced notes that summarized discussions
between it, its counsel, and an external public relations firm “regarding its
strategy for addressing media inquiries related to the [ship sinking].” 282 In
an attempt to get the documents back, the shipping company asserted the
attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine claiming “that the notes
discuss legal matters combined with [internal management’s] purview of
public relations, and that most of the notes summarize discussions with [its]
counsel concerning legal strategy for addressing media inquiries regarding
the [sinking].” 283 The court, however, denied work product protection
finding that the corporation would have created notes concerning press and
public relations strategies in the normal course of business without the
threat of litigation and explaining that “[t]he information detailed is not the
sort that would be sought only because litigation was anticipated.” 284 Thus,
when deciding whether the work would have been produced in the ordinary
course of business, the court attempted to discern what other motives might
have existed for creating the work. Because it determined that the work
around legal PR was motivated by more than simply the anticipated
litigation, it denied protection.
However, the “because of” test does not require that the motivation for
the work be primarily or solely because litigation was anticipated. To the
contrary, material under this test is supposed to be protected even if there
279. See supra notes 201–03 and accompanying text.
280. This is also true for courts that apply the “primary purpose” test. If the material does
not actually reference the litigation, the court might presume it was prepared for ordinary
business reasons. In Hardy, for example, the court began by stating the ordinary course of
business exception. Hardy v. N.Y. News Inc., 114 F.R.D. 633, 644 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). It
analyzed whether the “primary purpose” of the work was to prepare for litigation by taking
into account that “there [was] no reference in any of the[] documents to the [opposing party]
or to litigation generally, and . . . no reference to litigation in the affidavit of [the consultant]
regarding the purpose of [the] assignment.” Id. at 645.
281. No. 03 Civ. 3573 LTSRLE, 2005 WL 3455782 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 2005).
282. Id. at *1.
283. Id. at *3.
284. Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted).
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are multiple motivations for the work as long as one of the motivations was
anticipated litigation. 285 Granted, the court was not wrong in determining
that regardless of whether litigation would ensue, if a ship sinks, the
shipping company will likely meet with PR consultants in the ordinary
course of business to manage the publicity surrounding the event. But it
failed to consider the possibility that the manner and form of the work—
that is, the way the consultation was handled, what communications were
shared, what notes might have been written—may have been different
because litigation was erupting. 286 Moreover, it appears that the court
believed that PR (even if it is what might be called legal PR) is always the
business of business and not the business of law. In keeping with that, the
court denied attorney-client privilege protection because the notes
“contain[ed] discussions of non-legal issues, including business, press and
public relations strategies.” 287
Another case that exemplifies the problems identified above is Proctor &
Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp. 288 Originally, Procter & Gamble (P&G) sued
Amway for defamation, fraud, and unfair trade practices, among other
things. 289 It claimed that Amway spread a rumor connecting P&G with the
Church of Satan. 290 Amway then brought a suit claiming that P&G
tortiously interfered with Amway’s business relations by “support[ing] . . .
an internet web site that contain[ed] vulgar, false and defamatory statements
about Amway, and through its dissemination of press releases contain[ed]
false and misleading statements about Amway.” 291 Amway sought
discovery of documents related to P&G’s public relations plans to clarify
the rumors and the publicity around the litigation.292
In denying work product protection to documents that discussed which
defamation litigation targets to pursue and the purpose of the litigation,293
the court emphasized the ordinary business exception.294 It explained that
the work product doctrine does not apply if there is “some other purpose or

285. See supra notes 192–94 and accompanying text.
286. See de Espana, 2005 WL 3455782, at *3 (finding without explanation that “ABS has
not shown that the notes would not otherwise have been prepared in a substantially similar
form”). Interestingly, this judge inaccurately stated that the rule for the court was that “a
party generally must show that the documents were prepared principally or exclusively to
assist in anticipated or ongoing litigation” and cited to a case that accurately stated that the
test to be applied in the Second Circuit was the “because of” test. Id. (citing MSF Holding
Ltd. v. Fiduciary Trust Co. Int’l, No. 03 CIV 1818PKLJCF, 2005 WL 3046287, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 2005)).
287. Id.
288. No. 1:98-CV-726, 2001 WL 1818698 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 3, 2001).
289. Procter & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 280 F.3d 519, 523 (5th Cir. 2002).
290. Id. at 522–24; Amway Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co., No. 1:98-CV-726, 1999 WL
33494857, at *1–2 (W.D. Mich. June 29, 1999). P&G had also sued other parties for
defamation related to this same rumor. Procter & Gamble, 280 F.3d at 523.
291. Amway, 1999 WL 33494857, at *1.
292. Procter & Gamble, 2001 WL 1818698, at *1.
293. Id. at *7–8.
294. Id. at *8.
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obligation” that “was sufficient to cause [the work] to be prepared.”295
According to the court, the work in question was designed to garner
positive publicity for the company in order to counteract the rumors,
“[a]lthough pending and prospective lawsuits are mentioned in these
documents, or the redacted portions thereof, the purpose of the discussion
was to assess the public relations aspects of the lawsuits, not their legal
import or merit. . . . [The] documents were produced for public relations
and other business purposes.” 296
The problem with this reasoning is twofold. First, the underlying suits
were for public defamation and, therefore, any litigation that the company
pursued was necessarily designed not only to stop the defamation, but also
to counteract the defamatory press. Second, P&G sought help from PR
experts to understand which litigation targets would be more viable for the
company. If the selected targets would be seen as too sympathetic, the
corporation would be unable to win the lawsuit—not to mention the harm
this defeat would cause to the company’s reputation. Indeed, some of the
Further, the court
memorandums made both of these points.297
acknowledged that these documents exposed P&G’s litigation strategy
(albeit an unscrupulous one) and “analyze[d] the public relations aspects of
295. Id. at *6 (citing First Pac. Networks, Inc. v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Co., 163 F.R.D. 574, 582
(N.D. Cal. 1995)).
296. Id. at *5. According to the court, the documents communicated that (1) Amway was
having trouble finding the right defendants to sue because “[f]requently, persons
disseminating the rumor would immediately apologize and retract their statements when
confronted by Procter & Gamble. Procter & Gamble wanted to avoid the public relations
problems in pursuing ‘obviously sympathetic defendants,’” and (2) Amway “was eager to
blame a competitor for fostering the rumor, principally (but perhaps not solely) to enhance
Procter & Gamble’s competitive and public relations position in the marketplace.” Id. The
court provided quotes from some of the documents in question. See, e.g., id. (“At that time,
we will have another week’s experience on the number of phone calls and will want to assess
the need for more publicity, which is the primary objective of these lawsuits.” (citing
Document 12)); id. (“Our objective is to have a minimum of at least [sic] three additional,
geographically dispersed, cases in making our next press release.” (emphasis in original)
(citing Document 798)); id. at *7 (“The memo documents public relations strategy, which
included the possibility of filing lawsuits. It relates the company’s desire to ‘avoid
obviously sympathetic defendants.’ ‘However, we will definitely pursue other areas
particularly those showing business connections which may profit from continuation of the
rumor. We should continue to direct our energies towards those instances where information
has developed indicating a connection with a competitive company. Keep in mind that these
investigations are not being done for strictly Public Relations aspects, but that we intend to
exercise our full legal rights where appropriate.’” (citing Document 127)).
297. See, e.g., id. at *7 (“The redacted portions of document no. 383 fall in the same
category. The redacted discussion of ‘lawsuits/investigations’ reflects that the legal
department ‘has not been able to find a case which satisfied both Legal and Public Relations
needs.’” (citations omitted)); id. (“The memorandum reflects the ‘public relations risks’
associated with bringing suit against members of the clergy and defendants who ‘seem to be
poor, uneducated and apparently acting independently.’ It reiterates Procter & Gamble’s
desire, for public relations purposes, to tar a competitor with the charge of spreading the
rumor: ‘Obviously, we would prefer to have cases against people who would not engender
such sympathies (e.g., competitors, fanatics, someone with his own special interests, etc.),
but none are available at this time.’” (quoting Document 375)); id. (“[M]emo of public
affairs officer reflecting a desire to continue with lawsuits to demonstrate the company’s
seriousness and ‘to continue the publicity momentum.’” (quoting Document 375)).
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bringing a lawsuit” in order for the lawyers to determine which target they
should pursue. 298 As the documents explained, P&G needed a case that
would “satisf[y] both Legal and Public Relations needs.” 299 Though an
attorney must conduct a cost/benefit analysis about litigation that includes
PR concerns—especially when the client is suing or being sued for
defamation—the court still found that the documents failed the “because of”
test and that the ordinary course of business exception applied. 300 It
attempted to make a distinction between business and law and concluded
that the documents were “business and not legal documents . . . .
Disclosure of these documents exposes Procter & Gamble’s public relations
strategies, not its litigation strategy.” 301
In support of its decision to deny work product protection, the Amway
court repeatedly pointed out that the authors of the documents were not
lawyers and that the documents were shared with non-lawyers.302
However, there is much support that the work product doctrine, as outlined
in FRCP (26)(b)(3), protects documents prepared “by or for another party
or its representative”—not just work crafted by lawyers.303 Moreover, as
other courts have explained, the Rule also protects work designed to assist
in developing “all that is necessary to prosecute or defend a lawsuit” and
“the exchange of such documents and ideas with those whose expertise and
knowledge of certain facts can help the attorney in the assessment of any
aspect of the litigation.” 304 Though there was a business purpose to these
documents, the case law clearly states that “a document which has been
prepared because of the prospect of litigation will not lose its protection
under the work product doctrine, even though it may assist in business
decisions.” 305 Further, even if the Amway court accurately assessed that the
work would have been performed in the ordinary course of business to
298. Id.
299. Id. The court was obviously not happy with P&G. It reprimanded and sanctioned
P&G for its failure to follow discovery orders and provide the requisite details in its
privilege log. See id. at *8–11. The court voiced disgust with P&G’s motives and litigation
tactics. Id. at *8 (stating that the “statements do not reflect legal advice or core work product,
but merely the public relations problems that arise from bringing lawsuits against priests,
nuns, and other members of the clergy who innocently repeated the Satanism rumor”).
300. Unsurprisingly, the court’s definition and application of the “because of” test and/or
the ordinary course of business exceptions were not consistent with the doctrine. Id. at *6
(explaining that under the “because of” test, “[t]he document must have also been prepared
for purposes of the litigation and not for some other purpose” (emphasis added)).
301. Id. at *8. This contradicted the court’s earlier admittance that the documents
exposed the corporation’s litigation strategy. See supra note 298 and accompanying text.
302. See Amway, 2001 WL 1818698, at *6–8.
303. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3); see supra notes 219–226 and accompanying text
(explaining that there is disagreement around how much control or direction the lawyer need
have over the work of the nonlawyer in order for work product protection to apply).
304. NXIVM Corp. v. O’Hara, 241 F.R.D. 109, 128 (N.D.N.Y. 2007) (emphasis added);
see also United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 239 (1975); United States v. Adlman
(Adlman I), 68 F.3d 1495, 1502 (2d Cir. 1995).
305. NXIVM Corp., 241 F.R.D. at 128 (emphasis added). Although it was applying the
“because of” test, the court stated that “[t]he document must have also been prepared for
purposes of the litigation and not for some other purpose.” Amway, 2001 WL 1818698, at *6
(emphasis added).
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protect the corporation’s image, the court failed to consider that the
anticipation of litigation may have tinged the form and manner of the work.
Under this court’s view of corporate legal practice—as opposed to
corporate business—all documents related to managing public opinion are
considered ordinary business. While such a stance may be defensible, for
example, in the context of tobacco companies for whom the anticipation of
litigation is arguably part of the ordinary course of business and inextricable
from all business tasks, household products companies do not perpetually
face defamation litigation. As will be discussed in more detail, even though
PR work is an ordinary business task for all large consumer-oriented
corporations, it is unimaginable that threatened or actual concurrent
lawsuits would not impact the way in which PR is analyzed and executed.
IV. ANALYSIS AND PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS FOR FUTURE DEVELOPMENT
What do the cases described above tell us about the former and current
state of the work product doctrine and how we, as a profession, view the
role of the corporate attorney and define litigation? And do the answers to
those questions help us determine when an attorney’s work should be
protected in the corporate context by the work product doctrine and how to
revise the doctrine to provide such protection? It is to these questions that
this next section turns.
A. Analysis
This sampling of federal court opinions in the context of public relations
uncovers three primary problems with the current work product doctrine.
First, the work product doctrine allows judges to attempt to distinguish
business from law to determine whether the work product doctrine should
apply. Not only is such delineation arbitrary and artificial, it is arguably
inconsistent with the historical underpinnings of the work product doctrine.
Second, as applied, the work product doctrine hinges protection on the
judge’s view of the proper role of the corporate attorney and what litigation
preparation encompasses. Finally, in addition to enabling inconsistent
application, the work product doctrine fails to present a cohesive view of
the role of the corporate attorney or embrace the demands of contemporary
corporate attorneys representing clients in anticipation of litigation.
From its inception, the attorney-client privilege has always been about
communications between client and attorney for the purpose of obtaining
legal assistance. 306 Expectedly, in the literature and case law about the
corporate attorney-client privilege, there is debate about whether a
communication was generated for the purpose of obtaining legal, as
306. Cf. In re Cnty. of Erie, 473 F.3d 413, 419 (2d Cir. 2007) (applying attorney-client
privilege protection to lawyer emails proposing changes to existing policy to comply with
the law and guidance around other beneficial, though not legally required, policy changes);
id. at 422 (“When a lawyer has been asked to assess compliance with a legal obligation, the
lawyer’s recommendation of a policy that complies (or better complies) with the legal
obligation—or that advocates and promotes compliance, or oversees implementation of
compliance measures—is legal advice.”).
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opposed to business, advice and whether a communication with a third
party consultant should ever be protected.307 But these debates are
misplaced in the work product context. The work product doctrine has
always been designed to include conversations with, and work created by,
non-lawyers, 308 business people, and any advice (business or otherwise)
that might help with any aspect of case preparation or potential litigation.
Yet courts, when analyzing whether work product protection applies,
debate whether the purpose of the work was for business, as opposed to
legal, advice. This leads courts to consider whether the lawyer consulted a
third party and whether that third party’s line of work is concerned with
legal as opposed to business issues. 309 As demonstrated above, these
digressions are, in part, a byproduct of the “primary purpose” test which
requires the court to decipher whether the primary motivating reason for the
work was for litigation or business purposes. The problem is that trying to
decipher what is done primarily for litigation as opposed to business
purposes is, to borrow the words of Judge Richard Owen, “artificial,
unrealistic, and the line between is . . . essentially blurred to oblivion.”310
Thus, the analysis often devolves into whether the work “carries much more
the aura of daily business than it does of courtroom combat.” 311
Framing the question in this way naturally affects the answer. Unless the
work coincides with the historically narrow vision of the lawyer as an
adversary in combat, it is not protected. 312 However, case management and
litigation preparation today are very different than they used to be and
simply cannot be summed up as work done in preparation for “courtroom
combat.” Undeniably, the words “litigation” and “case” today encompass
more than just the “trial.” 313 Real courtroom combat only occurs in less
307. See id. at 419.
308. This may also be true when non-lawyers create work without supervision by, or
direction of, an attorney. See supra Part I.B.2.
309. As discussed above, courts also erroneously collapse their analysis of the attorneyclient privilege with that of the work product doctrine.
310. In re Woolworth Corp. Sec. Class Action Litig., No. 94 CIV. 2217 (RO), 1996 WL
306576, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 1996) (holding that notes and memoranda created during an
investigation led by lawyers and accountants were protected by work product doctrine).
311. United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 544 (Former 5th Cir. 1982); see also
United States v. Textron Inc. & Subsidiaries, 577 F.3d 21, 43 (1st Cir. 2009).
312. Literature on the psychology of choice suggests that how a choice is framed
materially affects what decision is made by the decisionmaker. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman
& Amos Tversky, Choice, Values, and Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 341, 343 (1984)
(explaining the “failure of invariance,” that is, that rational actors do not make the same
choices irrespective of the way the decision is framed); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman,
The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453, 453 (1981);
supra note 78. In support of this is the court’s analysis in NXVIM Corp. justifying denial of
work product protection in part because it was “for another benefit other than aiding the
lawyer pitched in the battle of litigation.” NXIVM Corp. v. O’Hara, 241 F.R.D. 109, 142
(N.D.N.Y. 2007) (emphasis added); see supra notes 270–275 and accompanying text.
313. Indeed the FRCP make this clear. See supra notes 129 and 132. See also PeaseWingenter, supra note 2, at 154 (explaining that “the term ‘litigation’ has a much broader
meaning than ‘trial’”). More specifically,
‘Litigation’ includes civil and criminal trial proceedings, as well as adversarial
proceedings before an administrative agency, an arbitration panel or a claims

1924

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

than five percent of cases and oral hearings are rare.314 Thus, an attorney’s
preparation for anticipated litigation does not only involve the preparation
for the ultimate, actual trial, but also pre-trial motions (such as motions to
dismiss and motions for summary judgment), maneuvers to limit the
number and types of charges that might be brought by regulators and/or
stockholders, and tactics and strategies to bulwark negotiation power.
Much of the preparation and steps in the litigation process—although
completed with an eye towards a potential trial—are meant to prevent the
filing of a suit, initial or future charges, or convince the other side to settle
or make the case go away (by winning a motion to dismiss or summary
judgment). And arguably, all of this “work” is part of litigation and is
fortified by the right perceptions of influential players. How regulators
view the corporation’s actions, how the opponent perceives the strength of
the case, and how the public consumer views the controversy as a
normative or practical matter necessarily impacts the risks versus benefits
calculus of proceeding with actual litigation. 315 These tasks align with the
historical purpose of the work product doctrine—to enable attorneys to
consult with others to determine the weaknesses of their clients’ cases,
commission, and alternative-dispute-resolution proceedings such as mediation or
mini-trial. It also includes a proceeding such as a grand jury or a coroner’s inquiry
or an investigative legislative hearing. In general, a proceeding is adversarial
when evidence or legal argument is presented by parties contending against each
other with respect to legally significant factual issues. Thus, an adversarial
rulemaking proceeding is litigation for purposes of the immunity.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 87 cmt. h (2000); see also In re
Grand Jury Proceedings, No. M-11-189, 2001 WL 1167497, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2001).
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 16 codifies work-product protection for documents
prepared “during the case’s investigation or defense” in criminal proceedings. FED. R. CRIM.
P. 16(b)(2)(A). Because Rule 16 refers to proceedings in which there is a named defendant,
it does not specifically apply to investigatory procedures of a grand jury. See In re Grand
Jury Subpoena, 599 F.2d 504, 509 (2d Cir. 1979). Nevertheless, the work product protection
rule “has been applied to grand jury proceedings.” Id.; see also In re Grand Jury Subpoena,
484 F.Supp. 1099, 1102 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
314. According to Marc Galanter, “[t]rial activity is diminishing not only in comparison
to the rest of the legal world, but compared to the society and the economy.” Marc Galanter,
A World Without Trials?, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 7, 31 (“[T]here are fewer trials per capita and
fewer trials per unit of GDP.”); see also id. at 14 (showing that from 1992 to 2001, the
number of tort, contract, and real property cases declined 47% in state courts, the number of
tort trials in federal court declined 37.6%, and contract trials in federal court declined
47.7%); Marc Galanter, The Hundred-Year Decline of Trials and the Thirty Years War, 57
STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1255 (2005) (explaining that there is a long term and gradual decline in
the percentage of cases that terminate in trial and a more extreme decline in the actual
number of trials during the past twenty years); Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An
Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 459, 461 (2004) (reporting that the percentage of civil cases reaching trial in
federal court dropped from 11.5% in 1962 to 1.8% in 2002); id. at 492–93 (showing that
federal criminal cases in federal courts decreased by approximately 30% from 1962 to 2002
despite an increase in the number of criminal defendants); cf. Neal Ellis, Saving the Jury
Trial, BRIEF, Summer 2005, at 15, 15 n.3 (reporting that the U.S. Department of Justice
issued a study in 2005 that showed an 80% decrease in federal tort trials from 1985 to 2003
(citing Thomas B. Cohen, Federal Tort Trials and Verdicts: 2002–2003, BUREAU JUST.
STAT. BULL. 2, 2 (2005), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fttv03.pdf)).
315. See supra notes 274–75, 314 and accompanying text.
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fortify the strengths of their clients’ positions, develop effective litigation
strategies—including those that may (for their clients’ benefit) end the
litigation almost as soon as it starts. 316 This Article contends, therefore,
that managing legal PR is inextricably part of case preparation in
anticipation of litigation. Yet a court that has a more narrow view of
corporate practice—a court that views anything that sniffs of PR as having
the “aura of daily business” 317—might deny work product protection,
despite the fact that such a demarcation is not in keeping with corporate
practice today or the theory of litigation, and is artificial at best.
Although the primary purpose test lends itself to this type of artificial line
drawing, ironically, the same issues abound in application of the “because
of” test. At first blush it might appear that the two tests—the narrower
“primary purpose” test and the broader “because of” test—represent the two
ends of the spectrum, epitomizing the extremes of the burgeoning debate
about what it means to be a corporate attorney. Conceivably, the narrower
“primary purpose” test—which essentially asks judges to disaggregate
decisions mostly based on a business/law distinction—represents a more
narrow view of the role of the corporate attorney and breadth of litigation.
Ideally, the “because of” test—which is a much broader test providing
protection for any work developed because of pending litigation—embraces
a broader role for the corporate attorney. However, characterizing the two
tests as operating on a continuum that moves from a narrow to broad
conception of the corporate attorney and litigation, or that moves from
requiring a distinction between business and law to one that embraces the
melding of the two, is untoward. In application, the “because of” test also
enables work product decisions to hinge on how narrowly a court views the
role of the corporate lawyer and an “artificial, unrealistic” line to be drawn
between business and law.
First, as is the case when a court applies the primary motivating factor
test, if a court narrowly interprets case management or litigation
preparation, even under the “because of” test, work can easily be denied
protection. Although it is fairly clear that the work product doctrine
protects materials prepared by non-lawyers, courts use the fact that the work
was created by non-lawyers to buttress decisions to deny work product
protection. Further, they infuse the “because of” test with a primary
motivating factor analysis. Second, as described in the PR related cases
above, some courts applying the ordinary course of business test (the direct
corollary to the “because of” test), also incongruently apply a “primary
purpose” test. This move is a non sequitur. The ordinary course of
business exception does not require that the court decipher the motivating
purpose behind the work let alone the primary motivating purpose. 318
Instead, the exception merely asks the court to consider whether an
316. See supra notes 158–66 and accompanying text.
317. United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 544 (Former 5th Cir. 1982).
318. But see Wilson, supra note 180, at 601 (interpreting FRCP 26 to mean that it does
not deny protection for material made in the ordinary course of business entirely, but instead
material made in the ordinary course of business for non-litigation purposes).
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“ordinary” task, generally performed by a type of person or department,
was done in substantially the same way despite the anticipated litigation.
Unfortunately, courts consistently fail to consider that work may have been
conducted in an “unordinary” manner because the parties were acting with
“an eye towards litigation.” In other words, courts fail to recognize that the
task may be the same but the output may be different, or that the output
may look the same but the work leading up to it was different.
Arguably, the ordinary course of business exception itself is completely
unworkable and too blunt of an instrument. On the one hand, it should be
obvious that work will be done differently when litigation is looming than
when it is not. For example, while a quarterly disclosure statement—which
is issued regularly regardless of any anticipated litigation—would be
considered done in the “ordinary course of business” and not protected as
work product, 319 when the company is facing high profile litigation, the
quarterly disclosure statement is informed and crafted in a manner that is
arguably anything but “ordinary.”
On the other hand, a large, public company exists in a world of
anticipated litigation and therefore, anticipating litigation is arguably the
ordinary course of business. 320 For example, after some analysis of the
risks and probabilities, a large manufacturer of camping goods might view
anticipating and handling litigation stemming from consumers using lamps
inside their tents as part of the ordinary course of business. That said, if the
impending suit was for securities’ fraud, then such litigation might not be
considered part of the normal course. In addition to the seriousness, the
timing and status of the impending litigation may move something from the
ordinary to the extraordinary. If the consumer of the camping lamp wins at
a lower court level, suddenly what was an ordinary course of business
lawsuit becomes more important and stops being ordinary. Yet, the

319. Id. at 600 (explaining that in this scenario, the statements should receive work
product protection because “[o]ne categorization is not exclusive of the other; one purpose
does not necessarily exclude the other purpose. Whether or not a company’s attorney
prepares the materials regularly and systematically, to the extent that they reflect his
opinions or mental impressions concerning certain circumstances involved in litigation, they
are opinion work product.”).
320. Some cases have suggested or held that, while claims documents generated in the
ordinary course of business by a casualty insurer may not be work product unless and until
something happens that indicates a lawsuit is likely, the claims documents generated by a
liability insurer may always fall under work product, even though prepared in the ordinary
course of business, because when considering a claim under a liability insurance policy, the
insurer is conducting ordinary business that by its very nature is always in anticipation of
litigation. Ashmead v. Harris, 336 N.W.2d 197 (Iowa 1983) (holding that even a routine
investigation by an insurer into a claim by a third-party on a liability policy is in anticipation
of litigation and thus within the work product protection); see also Brown v. Superior Court,
670 P.2d 725 (Ariz. 1983) (noting the issue). Although the absolute protection of insurer
files in Ashmead v. Harris, 336 N.W.2d 197 (Iowa 1983), is the minority position, see
Langdon v. Champion, 752 P.2d 999, 1006 (Alaska 1988), other courts have also found such
documents to be subject to work product protection on a case-by-case basis. See Askew v.
Hardman, 918 P.2d 469 (Utah 1996). I thank Professor Sisk for introducing this point and
these cases in support.
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ordinary course of business exception is not written or interpreted to
encompass those nuances.
As demonstrated in Part III.B, even the “because of” test enables judges
to deny or grant work product protection based on their definition of what
contemporary corporate practice entails. Those judges with a narrow view
of the role of the corporate attorney and legitimate litigation tactics can
deny protection of work that involves other disciplines like public relations.
However, the opposite is also true, those with a broad view of what
corporate legal services comprises can find a way to apply protection.
Although the history of the work product doctrine supports a very broad
net, the “because of” test enables judges embracing an expansive role of the
corporate attorney to protect some work that perhaps should not receive
work product protection. As it currently stands, the “because of” test
enables protection of work that is completely unrelated to lawyers’
management of the legal controversy. For example, one might meet with
PR executives to devise a PR campaign to help the corporation’s brand
image because impending litigation is producing substantial negative press.
This PR campaign would never have been conceived if not for the
impending litigation and thus was not prepared in the ordinary course of
business but instead “because of” litigation. However, the primary
motivation for the PR campaign was to protect market share—not to win a
lawsuit or help the lawyer prepare for the case or make decisions about the
case. 321 Still, under the “because of” standard, all meetings and preparation
work around this marketing campaign could be protected as work product
by a judge that has a broad view of what it means to represent a client in
anticipation of litigation. Arguably, this goes too far in the other direction.
Lastly, in a recent decision on the work product doctrine, the U.S Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit uncovered one of the issues this Article
identifies: “how far work product protection extends turns on a balancing
of policy concerns rather than application of abstract logic.”322 Although
this is likely true of most doctrine, the problem is that this balancing of
policy concerns is unguided. 323 Each jurisdiction does not have a stable set

321. A good example of this tactic is the PR campaign by Merck in 2005. For the six
months preceding a Vioxx trial in Texas, Merck “saturated” the specific city in which the
trial was to be held with image advertising. Evidently, it spent almost double the amount it
spent on its national ad campaign the preceding year in those six months targeting that
specific city. Larry Smith, Merck’s Powerful Tactical Advantage in the Court of Public
Opinion, OF COUNS., Nov. 2006, at 12, 13 (explaining that “a white noise of positive
messaging about the defendant . . . can be as ultimately decisive as any evidentiary
material”); id. (reporting that “from January through June 2005—just a few weeks before one
Vioxx trial began in Texas—Merck spent $8.9 million on ‘image’ ads alone, up from $4.6
million during all of 2004”); id. (reporting that the year that Merck found out “there was
legal trouble ahead” it “outspent Budweiser and Pepsi[,] . . . spending more than $160
million, the most ever for a prescription drug” and that the “advertising paid off for Merck as
retail sales quadrupled”).
322. United States v. Textron Inc. & Subsidiaries, 577 F.3d 21, 26 (1st Cir. 2009).
323. Cf. generally Richard K. Greenstein, The Nature of Legal Argument: The Personal
Jurisdiction Paradigm, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 855 (1987) (making a similar argument with
respect to personal jurisdiction doctrine).
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of policy concerns that are given varying weight. Instead, each court uses
its own idiosyncratic policy concerns and arguably these concerns are
based, in part, on the courts’ view of what is the proper role of the corporate
attorney.
As described above, the “because of” test embraces both a very broad
and a very narrow interpretation of the responsibilities of the contemporary
corporate attorney in litigation preparation. Yet it also enables a more
moderate approach. For example, in Haugh, an age discrimination case, the
plaintiff’s former attorney retained a public relations consultant (who was
also a licensed lawyer) to develop a media strategy to assess potential
public reactions to certain litigation strategies and how PR spin might affect
the litigation strategy. The documents in question included a draft press
release that contained the PR consultant’s written comments, the PR
consultant’s handwritten notes, and a meeting agenda. 324 According to the
court, the PR consultant handled media relations and worked with the
lawyer to draft press releases about the litigation and develop both litigation
and PR strategies taking into account the impact that certain tactics might
have on the viability of the litigation strategy. 325 The court denied attorneyclient privilege protection because the PR consultant only performed
“standard” or “ordinary” public relations services akin to a public relations
campaign and had not shown that the communications with the PR
consultant were “necessary” to the lawyer to provide legal advice to his
client. 326
In its analysis of the work product doctrine, however, the court applied
the “because of” test and protected the work. It explained that the work
product doctrine “protects a lawyer’s ability to prepare his client’s case,
protects against the disclosure of the attorney’s mental impressions,
conclusions, strategies, or theories, and also avoids the unfairness that
would occur if one party were allowed to appropriate the work of
another.” 327 Therefore, it concluded, “All of the documents submitted in
conjunction with this motion are covered by the work product privilege, as
they were all prepared by a party, her agent, attorney or consultant in
anticipation of litigation.” 328 Thus, although the court viewed the attorney
client privilege as only protecting an attorney’s role in providing legal
advice, it drew no similar line when analyzing protection under the work
product doctrine. Therefore, generally speaking, 329 the Haugh court
correctly approached the analysis.
324. Haugh v. Schroder Inv. Mgmt. N. Am., Inc., No. 02 CIV 7955 (DLC), 2003 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 14586, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2003).
325. Id. at *3–4 (citation omitted).
326. Id. at *8; id. at *9–10 (“Some attorneys may feel it is desirable at times to conduct a
media campaign, but that decision does not transform their coordination of a campaign into
legal advice.” (citing Calvin Klein Trademark Trust v. Wachner, 198 F.R.D. 53, 55
(S.D.N.Y. 2000))).
327. Id. at *12–13.
328. Id. at *15.
329. The problem, however, is that the “because of” test can be applied broadly,
perfunctorily, and overinclusively. It can be construed so broadly that even when it is clear
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In sum, the work product doctrine as it stands today enables courts to
take an expansive, moderate, or limited approach to contemporary corporate
practice and litigation and litigation preparation. As a result, the case law
fails to reflect a unified picture of the corporate attorney’s role or consensus
on the breadth of litigation and the profession’s protective doctrines.
Considering the sample of work product cases from the PR context, courts’
definitions of the corporate attorney’s role runs the gamut—from delivering
traditional legal services to developing PR plans. 330 Thus, as currently
constructed, the doctrine fails to provide predictable protection for the
responsibilities and obligations of the contemporary corporate attorney
managing or preparing for litigation.
B. Possible Solutions and Preliminary Recommendations
This Article is primarily concerned with identifying problems with the
work product doctrine and demonstrating that the doctrine provides a lens
through which we can view the debate about the proper role of the
contemporary corporate attorney. To that end, instead of constructing a
new test for determining whether work product protection should apply
based on the three problems identified above, this section identifies the
goals toward which any new solution should strive, makes general
recommendations on how to fix the doctrine, and offers one possible
solution that might, after further development and analysis, meet those
goals and embrace these recommendations.

that the communications are solely to attempt to garner positive publicity to help the
business stay afloat and not conducted to help the client in its anticipated litigation in some
way, they can be protected under the “because of” standard because arguably they would not
have been prepared but for the litigation. Some courts, however, do a better job at making a
distinction. For example, in Burke v. Lakin Law Firm, PC, No. 07-CV-0076-MJR, 2008 WL
117838 (S.D. Ill. Jan. 7, 2008), the court determined that “[t]he emails include[d]
attachments that provide strategies for communicating with employees, clients, and the
media, and proposed letters to be sent to employees and clients reassuring them of the firm’s
stability” should not be protected by the work product doctrine. Id. at *2. Instead, it stated
that
the documents involved here do not involve preparation or legal strategies for
conducting litigation itself, nor do they discuss how Defendants plan to defend this
or any other action. Instead, the documents discuss preparation and strategy for
minimizing the public relations fallout that could result from pending litigation.
And though the work product doctrine may protect documents that were prepared
for one’s defense in a court of law, it does not protect documents that were merely
prepared for one’s defense in the court of public opinion.
Id. at *3. It is a nuance that is hard to make—especially under the “because of” standard.
For instance, in Calvin Klein Trademark Trust v. Wachner, 198 F.R.D. 53 (S.D.N.Y. 2000),
the district court did not apply work product protection to communications that “strategiz[e]
about the effects of the litigation on the client’s customers, the media, or on the public
generally.” Id. at 55. Instead, it made clear that protection would only accord to
circumstances wherein “the public relations firm needs to know the attorney’s strategy in
order to advise as to public relations, and the public relations impact bears, in turn, on the
attorney’s own strategizing as to whether or not to take a contemplated step in the litigation
itself.” Id.
330. See supra note 321 and accompanying text.

1930

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

Based on the analysis above, any work product standard should meet
three goals. First, it should hew more closely to the historical purpose
behind work product and take into account the differences between it and
the attorney-client privilege. Therefore, as an overarching matter, courts
should take the “business” prong of the analysis out of the work product
doctrine entirely. Although in the attorney-client privilege context, courts
have to attempt to differentiate that which is arguably indistinguishable
(business and law), in the work product context judges should not attempt
to make such a distinction—especially given that the work product doctrine
was historically designed to enable lawyers to utilize non-legal expertise
when making decisions about how to handle a legal controversy.
Second, the work product doctrine should be easily applicable and
predictable (avoiding judicial ad hoc decisions), while reflecting the
demands of the contemporary corporate attorney. It should neither enable
judges to deny work product protection based on the judge’s personal view
of what is the proper role of the corporate attorney—especially when that
view is very narrow—nor be designed so broadly that that work product
protection applies to all work that an attorney recommends, oversees, or
comes across once the temporal anticipation of litigation has been met.
Third, it may be defensible to match the contours of work product
protection to the normative and practical commitments lawyers are charged
with realizing in contemporary corporate practice and litigation preparation.
So what type of test will accomplish these goals? First, the ordinary
course of business exception should be completely abolished.331 If courts
were to apply it as intended—that is, if courts were to truly take into
account whether the document was not “substantially” the same or in the
same form—any attorney worth his snuff could make a winning argument
that all business documents are substantially different when litigation is
impending or pending. Second, courts should not be placed in the
impossible position of having to determine a party’s motivation in creating
a document. 332 The analysis above makes clear that both tests devolve into
courts determining ex post the motivation behind the work—whether it was
331. Another scholar has recommended renouncing the ordinary course of business
exception but for different reasons. Wilson, supra note 180, at 559–600 (making this
recommendation because courts “plac[e] a heavier burden on the party resisting discovery”
and “the increased uncertainty of the standard encourages attorneys to either disguise all of
their materials as litigation documents or, in the extreme, discourages them from prudent
investigation and evaluation”).
332. Scholars writing in other areas of law have made similar arguments against using
“motivation” or “intent” as part of a legal standard. See, e.g., Adam Candeub, Comment,
Motive Crimes and Other Minds, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 2071, 2077 (1994) (“[L]aws which
require determining intent and motivation to a high specificity present courts with decisions
which cannot be made on a sound basis . . . [and] threaten both the credibility and
impartiality of the court room as well as freedom of thought.”); cf. Steven Alan Reiss,
Prosecutorial Intent in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1365, 1367,
1476 (1987) (arguing for a reversal of the “current preference for intent-based constitutional
regulation of prosecutorial behavior,” largely because courts, by tending to factor prosecutor
intent into determining whether a prosecutorial action is unconstitutional is “not only
unsystematic, but largely unreflective,” as well as inflicting significant system costs inherent
in employing such a system).
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motivated “primarily” or simply “because of” anticipated litigation. Once
courts enter into that type of determination, they inevitably assume the
near-impossible task of distinguishing law from business. Moreover, it
enables courts with a very narrow view of the role of corporate law practice
to deny protection and those with a very broad view to apply protection.
Therefore, as Sisk and Abbate have recommended in the context of the
attorney-client privilege, this Article argues that the scope of the work
product doctrine should “correspond to the dynamic changes in the practice
of law.” 333 As corporate case management and litigation services expand,
“the contours of the [work product doctrine] should be adjusted
proportionally.” 334 Further, “courts should be mindful of the necessarily
expanded role of corporate counsel in the modern legal and regulatory
environment.” 335 Granted, the work product doctrine should not be so
expansive that attorneys can use it to protect work unrelated to the
anticipated litigation. But, as Sisk and Abbate also argue, “the potential for
abuse” is not best addressed by “narrowly defining the nature of the
lawyer’s role or artificially constraining the topics that may be
considered . . . in addressing a legal matter.”336 Attorneys should be free to
talk to any third party that may be helpful to litigation and case
preparation—as defined broadly. And work product protection should
extend to work created by non-lawyers as it has historically. Given the
increase in regulations, types of available lawsuits, technology, and
globalization, the realm of activities that go into case management today is
much broader than it used to be. In addition to traditional considerations,
lawyers also take into account public relations, government relations, and
international regulations when building a case in anticipation of litigation.
That said, one way to reel in the potential for abuse is to require that work
created by non-lawyers be done at the direction or supervision of an
attorney in order to garner work product protection. This will help ensure a
tighter nexus between the non-lawyers’ work and the lawyer’s case
preparation.
1. Analysis of Solutions Offered by Others
Before moving into this Article’s preliminary recommendation, it is
helpful to review two new work product tests that have emerged recently.
Although at first glance both appear to meet the goals identified above, they
ultimately fall prey to some of the current doctrine’s pitfalls.
In Textron, the First Circuit’s most recent decision analyzing the work
product doctrine, the court concocted a new test that appears to sidestep the
333. Sisk & Abbate, supra note 9, at 204.
334. Id. One might argue that if Sisk and Abbate’s recommendation were adopted, the
need for such a change in the work product context might decrease. However, that might not
be the case unless the doctrine that provides protection to communications with third-party
consultants is also similarly expanded because work product is often developed in
conjunction with non-lawyers.
335. Id. at 231.
336. Id. at 230.
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need to make the squirrely law/business distinction. Despite having
adopted the “because of test” in the past,337 in Textron the First Circuit
applied a “for use in litigation” test. It denied protection to the work at
hand because only “case preparation materials” that “would be useful in the
litigation” could garner work product protection. 338 However, the First
Circuit appears to view the words “trial” and “litigation” as synonymous.339
For example, the court recognized that materials could be developed “in
advance of [litigation’s] institution,” 340 but reiterated that “[i]t is only work
done in anticipation of or for trial that is protected.” 341 As mentioned
above, construing the work product doctrine as only applying to “trial” and
not litigation342 is problematic given the rarity of trial.343
That issue aside, with this narrow construction, the test appears on its
face to prevent a court from determining whether work product will apply
by making a distinction between business and law. That is, if the party can
show that the materials were useful at trial—regardless of whether they
were also useful for business reasons—the work will be protected.
However, after closer analysis it does not seem likely that the First Circuit
meant for the analysis to be so simple. On the one hand, the court appears
to limit the analysis to whether the work could be considered useful at trial.
On the other hand, it also seems concerned with the motivation for why the
work was produced. To that end, the First Circuit’s description of the test
in some areas of the opinion seems to imply a motivation test. For
example, it states that work product protection is limited to “case
preparation materials” that are “designed for use at trial” or “prepared for
potential use in litigation.” 344 Thus, under this test, if a motivating reason
was for a business purpose but the work was also useful at trial, the First
Circuit might deny work product protection. Indeed, this is exactly what
happened in Textron. As the dissent points out, the lower court found that
the work had both litigation and business purposes. 345 However, the court
seemed to believe that if the work had even one business or regulatory
purpose, that protection for the work altogether should be denied. 346 Thus,
although the test appears to skirt the need to make a distinction between
business and law, it does not do so in application.
337. Maine v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 298 F.3d 60, 68 (1st Cir. 2002) (adopting and
applying the “because of” test); see also United States v. Textron Inc. & Subsidiaries, 577
F.3d 21, 32 (1st Cir. 2009) (Torruella, J., dissenting) (explaining that the First Circuit
adopted the “because of” test and is abandoning it with this decision).
338. Textron, 577 F.3d at 28–29 (explaining that “[f]rom the outset, the focus of work
product protection has been on materials prepared for use in litigation”).
339. Pease-Wingenter, supra note 2, at 153–55 (“The Fifth Circuit’s ‘primary purpose’
test gives effect only to the latter, narrow term [trial] and not the former, much broader one
[litigation].”).
340. Textron, 577 F.3d at 29 (emphasis omitted).
341. Id. at 30.
342. Defined distinctly as “[t]he process of carrying on a lawsuit.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1017 (9th ed. 2009).
343. See supra note 314 and accompanying text.
344. Textron, 577 F.3d at 26–30; id. at 32 (Torruella, J., dissenting).
345. Id. at 39.
346. Id. at 42.
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More importantly, the test does not circumvent the other problem
identified in this Article, namely that judges that adopt a very narrow view
of the role of the corporate attorney may deny protection to work that was
designed to help lawyers at trial if the judge does not believe it should be
used or helpful at trial. The First Circuit had a very solid idea of what
material is protectable when it claimed that the focus of the work product
doctrine is on “materials that lawyers typically prepare for the purpose of
litigating cases.” 347 Further, it believed that the determination was easy:
“Every lawyer who tries cases knows the touch and feel of materials
prepared for a current or possible . . . law suit.”348 But as the dissent
pointed out, this cannot be right given “a host of cases which grapple with
tough work product questions that go beyond the stuff that ‘[e]very lawyer
who tries cases’ would know is work product.” 349 Lastly, this test is
exceedingly narrow—narrower than the “primary motivating” test 350—
which, as discussed above—and as critiqued by many other scholars—
severely limits protection to a point that is inconsistent with the historical
underpinnings of the doctrine itself.351
Another possible solution could be an “intertwined test,” one that confers
protection when the business and legal motivations are inextricably
intertwined. For example, in a recent case, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that
work product protection applied because “taking into account the facts
surrounding their creation, their litigation purpose so permeates any nonlitigation purpose that they cannot be discretely separated from the factual
nexus as a whole.” 352 Similarly, in the attorney-client privilege context,
Sisk and Abbate suggest that the attorney-client privilege should apply
when law-related services and non-legal components of legal advice are
“merged seamlessly together with a law practice,”353 when legal and
business advice and services are offered as an “integrated package of legal
services,” 354 or when “non-legal components of a communication are
intertwined with genuine and material requests for legal advice from
corporate counsel.” 355 Terrence Perris recommends a slightly different
rendition of an “intertwined” test in the context of tax contingency reserves.
He argues that work product protection should attach when “the prospect of
future litigation and the business need for the documents are so intertwined
347. Id. at 26 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
348. Id. at 30.
349. Id. at 34 (Torruella, J., dissenting).
350. Id. at 32 (describing the majority’s test as narrower than the “primary purpose test”
and arguing that the work product rule does not say work must have been prepared to
actually aid litigation to qualify as work product). The majority itself provides many clues
that it views the doctrine very narrowly. For example, in the second page of the opinion, the
First Circuit framed the work product doctrine as “the qualified privilege available for
litigation materials.” Id. at 24 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
351. See supra Part II.A.
352. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 350 F.3d 1010, 1018 (9th Cir. 2003).
353. Sisk & Abbate, supra note 9, at 226.
354. Id. at 226–27 (explaining that the privilege should extend to “law-related services
that rotate around a legal nucleus”).
355. Id. at 231.
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that the prospect of future litigation itself creates the business need for the
document.” 356
The various renditions of an “intertwined test” appear to move in the
right direction and address the problematic issues of the current doctrine.
They seem to evade delineating what is business from what is law and
prevent judges from denying work product protection simply because they
have a very narrow view of corporate practice. However, arguably these
tests are as broad (if not broader) than the current “because of” test. For
example, impending litigation can impact a corporation’s bottom line and
create a business need to more heavily market the brand. As explained
above, a marketing plan designed to improve brand image and awareness
could be deemed work product under the “because of” test. 357 Similarly, it
could be deemed work product under an “intertwined” test because it could
be viewed as work that was intertwined with the “genuine and material
requests for legal advice from corporate counsel” about how to manage the
impending litigation given the potential negative PR ramifications.358
Thus, while the First Circuit’s test was too narrow and enabled a distinction
between law and business, an intertwined test is too broad. The challenge,
therefore, is to develop a test that not only avoids those extremes, but also
addresses the other issues identified in this Article.
2. Tentative Preliminary Recommendation
Although not fully developed, a possible solution might be to confine
work product protection to work by attorneys or work supervised by
attorneys that is designed to, can, or actually does facilitate any litigationrelated activity or decision—without respect to whether the work was also
designed to, can, or actually does facilitate making a business decision.359
Thus, work that assists in preparing materials for trial, or in making
decisions about whether to file for summary judgment, implement a certain
litigation tactic, proceed to trial, settle, file a claim, or raise a defense or
counterclaim, would be protected. Work that aids a lawyer in assessing the
strengths and weaknesses of a client’s case or in its positioning among
regulators and opponents would also be protected. As in the FRCP, the
word litigation is not confined to a trial. 360 Instead, this test protects work
356. Terrence G. Perris, Court Applies Work Product Privilege to Tax Accrual
Workpapers, PRAC. TAX STRATEGIES, Jan. 2008, at 4, 7 (“Under both the Adlman decision
and the more recent Roxworthy decision by the Sixth Circuit, it will be difficult for the IRS
to successfully argue that the work product privilege fails to attach when the anticipated
future litigation is itself the source of the business need for the document.”).
357. See supra note 321 and accompanying text.
358. Sisk & Abbate, supra note 9, at 231.
359. This recommendation is narrower than the contours of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which does not require that work be done under the direction or guidance of the
corporate attorney. This makes sense in the corporate context, given that lawyers drive the
direction of the case, and this will help ensure that the doctrine is not too expansive.
Whether this makes sense outside the corporate context is outside the contours of this paper.
360. See supra note 313. That said, it appears that courts do not agree on the scope of
litigation or litigation preparation and this may create issues for the application of this
proposal.
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that facilitates any tactical or strategic decision or action related to
managing a legal controversy when litigation around that legal controversy
is pending or impending (as defined by the current case law). Thus, if
attorneys can show that the work helped them make a strategic or tactical
decision about how to defend their case, proceed with developing the facts,
or interview witnesses, the work would be protected. Further, although the
doctrine appears to protect work that was created by non-lawyers even if
not at the direction or under the supervision of lawyers, this test requires
that the work was produced by non-lawyers at the direction of a lawyer or
under his/her supervision. This ensures that the doctrine does not become
too broad—as threatened by the current “because of” test.
Essentially, this test incorporates everything that would pass the First
Circuit’s narrow “for use” test. Yet it sidesteps the need to decipher
whether the motivating purpose was for business or law or whether the task
had a business purpose to it. Thus, it does not easily merge with an
attorney-client privilege analysis, and it slightly scales back the “because
of” test. Importantly, the outcome under this test would not change if a
judge has a very narrow view of the role of the corporate attorney.
To illustrate, consider a large drug manufacturing company that has just
learned that users are experiencing serious side effects. Litigation will
definitely occur, but before charges are filed, the company has to make
decisions that will impact what charges might be filed, what defenses it can
raise later on, 361 and its future negotiation leverage. 362 Thus, to determine
which strategies and tactics are most likely to produce an advantageous
outcome for its client, a lawyer and the CEO of the corporation might want
to ask a PR expert to calculate the negative press associated with settling a
case or pursuing a certain defense strategy. 363 The CEO, however, might
also want the PR expert to devise a media campaign to improve brand
image to offset the negative press from the legal controversy.
The documents prepared by the PR expert related to the decisions that the
lawyer is trying to make would be protected under this test. This makes
sense. Here, as was the case in United States v. Adlman, 364 a company is
361. Beardslee, supra note 44, at 739 (“[T]he PR consultants need guidance from
attorneys on how to position legal controversies and other types of disclosures to the public
in a way that comports with the law, does not instigate potential lawsuits, and is synergistic
with the legal strategy. . . . To be sure, a message in the court of public opinion that is
different than the message in the court of law can create inconsistencies that are fatal.”)
(internal quotations and citations omitted).
362. Id. at 737.
363. Id. at 738; Calvin Klein Trademark Trust v. Wachner, 198 F.R.D. 53, 55 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) (explaining that PR consultants need to understand legal strategies to provide PR
advice and PR advice influences attorneys’ strategic and tactical legal decisions). As
Kimberly Kirkland points out in another context, “[L]awyers make judgments about whether
to employ a targeted or ‘kitchen sink’ approach to litigation. A ‘kitchen sink’ approach is
one in which they would pursue every advantage, including making every non-frivolous
argument or objection available to them.” Kirkland, supra note 67, at 705. Understanding
the PR ramifications to taking such an approach might impact the lawyers’ opinions and help
them “make decisions about how aggressive to be with opposing counsel.” Id.
364. United States v. Adlman (Adlman II), 134 F.3d 1194 (2d Cir. 1998).

1936

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

faced with an “untenable choice.” If, out of fear of losing privileges, it
declines to fully analyze the legal PR ramifications from litigating or
selecting one case management or litigation strategy over another, “it
subjects itself . . . to ill-informed decisionmaking. On the other hand . . .
[such legal PR analysis] cannot be turned over to litigation adversaries
without serious prejudice to the company’s prospects in the litigation.”365
However, the brand marketing plan would not be protectable—as it might
be under the “because of” test or the “intertwined” test analyzed above.
Thus, at first blush, it appears that this approach would not only hew
more closely to the history and purpose behind the work product doctrine,
but would also serve several pragmatic ends. The approach, if adopted,
would ensure that the work product doctrine is appropriately constrained in
the corporate practice setting, providing meaningful protection only when it
is most needed. Moreover, it would reduce the amount of time courts spend
trying to distinguish between business and legal decisions—a largely
meaningless and inefficient endeavor. Lastly, as compared to the “primary
purpose” test, this approach enables work product to encompass a broader
view of corporate practice (one that accounts for the increasing reliance on
attorneys to play a quasi-public role) without protecting documents that
arguably are completely unrelated to pending litigation. 366
CONCLUSION
The overarching thrust of this Article is not to present answers, but
instead to uncover and turn focus to the serious questions hovering within
the work product doctrine in the corporate law arena: How, if at all, should
the line be drawn between the business of business and the business of law
and what is the proper role of the corporate attorney? This Article provides
only a snapshot of how the work product doctrine applies in a single
corporate context. However, if this snapshot is at all translatable to other
contexts (e.g., investment banking, accounting, marketing, morals) then it
may be true that the definition and application of the work product doctrine
have real consequences for the professions’ ability to identify the role
corporate attorneys can and should play in litigation and in society.
There are many business people, lawyers, judges, and scholars who argue
for increased responsibilities of lawyers. As mentioned above, many call
for lawyers to act as gatekeepers and moral counselors and believe that
lawyers are not providing competent “legal” service if it is not holistic and
multidisciplinary. Further, there has been an undeniable increase in the
types of responsibilities that corporate lawyers are asked to take on with
respect to corporate practice and litigation and the number and types of
regulations that require lawyers to play a quasi-public role. The question of
this Article is: As we change the rules to increase the practical and
365. Adlman II, 134 F.3d 1194, 1200 (2d Cir. 1998).
366. Such enlargement is, in part, set off by the reality that the temporal aspects of the in
anticipation requirement and the attorney-client privilege doctrine are both interpreted very
narrowly. See supra note 179 and accompanying text; supra Part II.B.1.b.
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normative responsibilities and expectations of corporate attorneys, should
not those rules that afford protections to attorneys also grow? When
corporate attorneys provide an expanded array of legal services that are
“right” for clients (and litigation preparation) and at the same time “not
wrong” for the public good, should not our protective doctrines follow suit?
Undeniably, we have moved to a world where the approach to legal
practice includes functions that were not traditionally considered legal in
nature. Concomitant with that move is a departure from the view of the
lawyer as the amoral legal technician. 367 Therefore, if the profession and
world at large have a more expansive view of litigation and what it means
to be a corporate attorney, and if the regulations, responsibilities, and
expectations of corporate attorneys continue to grow and include what
might have been dubbed years ago as “extra legal” duties, then it makes
sense for the doctrines that shield attorneys and attorneys’ work and
communications with clients to follow suit. To this end, the Article
concludes with a call to action to the legal profession, or perhaps better put,
an attempt to begin a focused, holistic discussion about the proper role of
the corporate attorney today.

367. See Regan, Jr., supra note 32, at 202–03 (making a similar point).

